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Part I. A Study of Stock Price Efficiency 
I 
Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate empirically the relationships between the static corporate 
1 2 governance and the stock return synchronicity, the dynamic corporate governance 
and the stock return synchronicity, and the regional governance and the stock return 
synchronicity of listed companies in China. We construct measures of corporate 
governance, regional governance and synchronicity for all listed firms on two A-share 
markets in China from the companies' annual reports from 1999 to 2002. Using the 
four-year panel data, we examine the effect of corporate and regional governance 
variables on stock return synchronicity after controlling for factors commonly 
considered in stock return synchronicity analysis. Our empirical results support 
several theoretical predictions; for example, we find that high concentration of 
shareholding among the second to the tenth largest shareholders, issuing shares to 
foreign investors and the high stake holding by largest shareholders have statistically 
significant and negative effects on stock return synchronicity. In addition, if the 
chairman or the general manger changes, it has statistically significant and negative 
effects on stock return synchronicity. After decomposing the chairman-change and the 
general manger-change variables, we find that the corporate governance related 
reasons for their departure are more effectible than non-corporate governance related 
ones on stock return synchronicity; external successors are more effective than 
internal successors; taking the position permanently is more effective than taking the 
position temporarily; independent board is more effective than if it is not. For the 
1 'Static corporate governance' in this thesis mainly refers to the stake of the largest shareholders, the sum of 
squares of the percentage points of shareholding by the 2"'' to the lO"^ largest shareholders, if a company has H 
shares or B shares traded, and if the largest shareholder is government or not. Because w e look at their levels rather 
than changes, w e n a m e it 'static corporate governance'. 
2 'Dynamic corporate governance' in this thesis mainly means the changes in the corporate governance structure, 
such as the changes of the chairman or the general manager. 
II 
regional governance mechanisms, we find that the closer the relationship between the 
government and the market is, the higher the stock return synchronicity is. And the 
higher the openness of the capital market is, the less the stock return synchronicity is. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Stock returns reflect market-level and firm-level information and the extent to which 
individual stock prices move together is known to vary both across countries and over 
time. As Roll (1988) makes clear, the extent to which stocks move together depends on 
the relative amounts of firm-level and market-wide information capitalized into stock 
prices. Morck et al. (2001) show that stock prices in low-income economies move much 
more synchronously than those in high-income economies in the mid 1990s. Campbell et 
al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) document a marked increase over several decades in 
firm-specific variation in the U.S. stock returns, and a consequent decline in the 
synchronicity of stock price movements in that country. 
Practitioners believe that good corporate governance does increase the firms' market 
valuation. Black (2001), Black et al. (2002), Gompers et al. (2003), and Joh (2003) find a 
positive correlation between performance measures and corporate governance. Tobin 
(1982) defined the stock market as more functional-form efficient if stock price changes 
induce a more economically efficient allocation of capital goods. A main purpose of 
institutional reforms is to increase the functional form efficiency through better corporate 
governance and better allocation of capital into the hands of better managers. We argue 
that better corporate governance mechanisms should decrease the stock return 
synchronicity because we believe that under better corporate governance, the 
firm-specific information should be better capitalized into stock prices, i.e. the stock price 
should better reveal the firm-specific information. This may reflect a less synchronicity in 
stock returns. 
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Several researchers have investigated stock market development and governance 
structures in selected transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, in most cases 
comparing Poland, and Czech Republic (Coffee, 1999; Johnson, Glaeser, and Shleifer, 
2001). All of these studies have focused on the role of formal law for building and 
monitoring stock markets and suggest that better investor protection in corporate law and 
securities regulations tends to foster market development. The current paper proposes that 
the strengthening of formal legal institutions, corporate and regional governance should 
decrease the stock return synchronicity. 
In this paper, we investigate these issues systematically for listed companies in China. We 
use a four-year panel data set collected from the firms' annual reports. Rather than rely on 
survey data, we use the actual corporate governance practice measures for all listed firms 
in China from 1999 to 2002. Controlling for a number of variables that are typically 
included in studies of the firm stock return synchronicity, we use RI to determine the 
synchronicity of these firms. Estimating both fixed-effects and random-effects models, 
we document statistically strong effects of static and dynamic corporate governance 
indicators and regional governance mechanisms on stock return synchronicity. And we 
find very strong empirical support for our main hypotheses that there are negative 
relationships between static corporate governance quality and stock return synchronicity, 
between dynamic corporate governance mechanisms and stock return synchronicity, and 
between regional governance quality and stock return synchronicity. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature on 
corporate governance and stock return synchronicity, describing our conceptual starting 
point. Section 3 summarizes major corporate governance and regional governance 
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mechanisms and discusses the variables used in our empirical study. Section 4 presents 
the data set, methodology and the panel regressions to explain synchronicity. Section 5 
presents the econometric analysis and Section 6 concludes with a summary of the results. 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Recent Work on Synchronicity 
Synchronicity is the extent to which individual stock prices move up and down en masse . 
Mainly, synchronicity can be measured in two ways. The first method is to calculate the 
fraction of stocks that move in the same direction in one region during some period. An 
alternative way to measure synchronicity is primarily by the magnitude of the variation in 
individual stock returns that is not explained by market returns. This can be measured 
either in absolute terms or as a fraction of total returns variation. High synchronicity 
indicates that stock prices are driven by aggregate factors, and that firm-specific 
determinants of value are relatively unimportant. 
Synchronicity appears to be inversely related to the quality of capital allocations 
decisions. Wurgler (2000) shows capital flows to be more responsive to value-added in 
countries where firm-specific variation is a greater part of the total variation in individual 
stock returns. This suggests that capital moves faster to its highest value uses where 
stocks move more asynchronously. 
Also in this vein, Durnev et al. (2002) show that the U.S. industries in which stock prices 
3 Morck et al. (2002) elaborate on this in the paper titled "Time Varying Synchronicity in Individual Stock Returns: A 
Cross-Country Comparison" 
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move more idiosyncratically also exhibit fewer signs of both overinvestment and 
underinvestment, as measured by the deviation of Tobin's marginal q ratios above and 
below their optimal value of approximately one. In essence, they argue that more 
firm-specific information in stock prices facilitates more efficient investment. 
Morck et al. (2000) speculate that stock returns might be less synchronous where 
institutions are stronger because strong institutions are conducive to informed risk 
arbitrage, which leads to more informed stock prices. A growing body of evidence 
appears consistent with such a linkage. 
Beny (2002) finds a significant positive correlation between the stringency of a country's 
prohibitions against insider trading and the asynchronicity of individual stock returns. 
She interprets the result as indicating that ‘in countries with tougher insider trading laws 
stock prices are more informationally efficient.' 
Bushman el al. (2002) find that stock returns exhibit greater firm-specific returns 
variation in countries with more developed financial analysis industries and with a freer 
press. This links greater firm-specific variation to cheaper and more accurate information. 
Goetzmann and Masso (2002) find that stock prices exhibit greater firm-specific variation 
in countries that permit short sales. This links greater firm-specific variation in individual 
asset prices to institutional arrangements that let arbitrageurs better capture quasirents 
associated with private information. 
Fox et al. (2002) find firm-specific price variation to be significantly higher in the years 
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following a major historical tightening in the U.S. disclosure law than in prior years for 
the most affected stocks, but not for other stocks. This again links greater firm-specific 
variation to freer information flow. 
Durnev et al. (2002) show returns more accurately predicting future earnings changes in 
industries with less synchronous returns, as measured by average market model R^ 
statistics. Collins et al. (1987), and others in the accounting literature, regard such 
predictive power as gauging the 'information content' of stock prices. In this sense, stock 
prices have greater information content when firm-specific variation is a larger fraction of 
total variation. 
Although the first method, to calculate the fraction of stocks that move in the same 
direction in one region during some period, is a direct and feasible measure of 
synchronicity in stock price movements, it is too simple so that the result is barely 
accurate. Furthermore, this method does not consider the effects of the various firm sizes 
on stock price movements. Hence, we adopt the other method which measure 
synchronicity primarily by the magnitude of the variation in individual stock returns that 
is not explained by market returns. 
2.2 Recent Work on Corporate Governance 
A large literature studies the link between corporate governance and firms' market value 
or performance. However, most of this literature focuses on developed countries and on 
particular aspects of governance, such as board composition, shareholder activism, 
executive compensation, insider share ownership or takeover defenses. The most closely 
related papers are Black (2001), Durnev and Kim (2005), Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
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(2003), and Klapper and Love (2004). These studies all have limitations. Most centrally, 
none has a good way to control for endogeneity or signaling. Black finds a strong 
correlation between a governance index and the share prices of Russian firms. However, 
he has a small sample of 21 large firms and minimal control variables. Also, his results 
may not generalize beyond Russia, with its notably poor country-level governance. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick study takeover defenses for U.S. firms. They report evidence 
that the decile of firms with the strongest takeover defenses have lower share prices than 
the decile with the weakest defenses. In most of the world, however, hostile takeovers are 
rare, and other aspects of governance are more salient. 
Durnev and Kim (2005) use a multicountry approach to assess whether governance 
choices predict firms' market value. Durnev and Kim find that higher scores on both the 
CLSA corporate governance index and S&P disclosure index predict higher Tobin's q for 
a sample of 859 large firms in 27 countries. However, their results are barely significant. 
Durnev and Kim attempt the instrumental-variable analysis in their paper. However, their 
instruments are suspect. They assume that industry does not affect governance. In 
contrast, Black, Jang and Kim (2005), and Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) find that 
industry does affect governance. 
2.3 Motivation—Why Stock Return Synchronicity Matters 
Stock return synchronicity might be economically important for mainly two general 
classes of reasons. 
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The first class of reasons is how the stock price synchronicity affects portfolio risk 
calculations and option valuation. In discussing their finding of increasing firm-specific 
variation in individual U.S. stocks, Campbell et. al (2001) note that many investors are 
not fully diversified, and so they are exposed to greater risk when firm-specific variation 
is greater. They further show that greater firm-specific variation in individual asset prices 
means investors need larger portfolios to fully diversify the risk. Campbell et. al (2001) 
also point out that greater firm-specific variation should affect option prices, as the Black 
Scholes equation and other option valuation shenanigans depend on the sum of 
firm-specific and market-related variation in the return of the underlying asset. 
The second general class of reasons for studying stock return synchronicity has to do with 
its implications regarding the real economy. 
First, the synchronicity of stock returns may be symptomatic of market inefficiencies. 
Campbell et al. (2001) point out that arbitrage is riskier if firm-specific variation is 
greater because arbitrageurs necessarily take large undiversified stakes. However, Roll 
(1988) shows that firm-specific variation is not associated with public information release, 
and consequently argue that firm-specific stock price movements reflect trading by 
arbitrageurs with private information. Extending this reasoning, Morck et al. (2000) argue 
that large firm-specific price movements may be evidence of more active arbitrage. 
Campbell et al. (2001) and Morck et al. (2000) are not inconsistent, for an exogenous 
increase in the return to arbitrage trading could lead to more arbitrage despite higher risk. 
Morck et al. (2000), viewing firm-specific variation as endogenous, posit that lower 
information gathering costs, better access to capital, and more secure property rights over 
trading profits all stimulate informed trading of the sort that Roll (1988) links to 
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firm-specific price changes. Campbell et al. (2001), viewing firm-specific variation as 
exogenous, argue that such price changes increase the risk exposure of informed 
arbitrageurs. Clearly, this point is correct. Whether an increase in firm-specific variation 
is exogenous or caused by other informed arbitrageurs, it qualifies as risk to any given 
investor, and so might dampen further informed arbitrage. The extent to which reductions 
in arbitrageurs' operating costs or increases in their trading profits lead to the 
capitalization of more information into prices must reflect a tradeoff between these 
countervailing factors. 
Second, the synchronicity of stock returns has implications for corporate governance. 
When a firm's stock price falls, various corporate governance mechanisms come into play. 
Morck et al. (1989) show that boards dismiss the chief executive officer (CEO) in 
response to negative firm-specific stock market performance, but not negative industry or 
market movements. They suggest that boards have difficulty assigning blame for 
downturns that affect more than the firm alone. Other corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as shareholder lawsuits, proxy contests, institutional investor pressure, and 
executive stock options, all depend on firm-specific share price changes distinguishing 
well-run from poorly-run companies. On the whole, corporate governance mechanisms 
are more effective when the firm-specific performance is more differentiable from 
general trends. 
Third, economic growth is thought to arise more from technological changes than from 
mere capital accumulation. Technological changes, as discussed by Schumpeter (1914) 
and modeled by e.g. Romer (1986), posit that innovative firms grow rapidly and displace 
established industry leaders in a process of creative destruction. The more intense this 
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creative destruction is, the more fundamental values of successful innovators should 
differ. Thus, a faster pace of creative destruction might cause larger firm-specific stock 
price changes. This point is not necessarily independent of the previous two, for King and 
Levine (1993) find evidence, consistent with the view of Schumpeter (1914)，that a 
well-developed financial system is a prerequisite to fast-paced creative destruction. 
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Chapter 3. Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1 Derivation of Independent Variables 
To search for candidate explanations for the different synchronicity of individual stock 
returns in different provinces in China, we need to consider elements that affect all 
provinces and all firms to different degrees. In this thesis, we mainly consider two 
elements to explain it, corporate governance mechanisms, and regional governance 
mechanisms. 
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.1.1.1 Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Good corporate governance consists of a set of mechanisms to ensure that suppliers of 
finance get a decent return on their investment. Better corporate governance means that 
the company has a better information disclosure mechanism; so that the firm stock return 
synchronicity is less. Generally speaking, there are two classes of mechanisms to improve 
the corporate governance in a firm. 
The first type consists of internal mechanisms, for example, the ownership structure, the 
board of directors, executive compensation, and financial disclosure. Of the four internal 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure is crucial to maximize the firm's value, for 
concentrated equity ownership offers the controlling shareholders substantial 
discretionary power to maximize their personal gain using the firm's resources. Claessens 
10 
et al. (2000) find that cross-holding and pyramidal ownership are common in Asian 
economies. This ownership structure allows controlling shareholders to obtain even more 
control for minimal capital expenses so that tunneling becomes easier. Listed companies 
in China usually have a controlling shareholder holding significant share stakes. 
Therefore, it is feasible for the controlling shareholders to transfer the resources out of 
listed companies into parents or other related parties' accounts. However, on the other 
hand, ownership concentration may also have a positive effect on corporate governance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argued that if ownership is initially dispersed, the emergence 
of a large shareholder mitigates the free-rider problem among shareholders attempting to 
monitor the managers. However, since listed companies are still young in China, we 
believe that increasing ownership concentration from a low level addresses the free-rider 
problem among shareholders so that it has a negative effect. Hence, we expect to see less 
synchronicity in firms that have higher ownership concentration. 
Financial transparency and adequate information disclosure are crucial in developing 
countries. To monitor the firm better, shareholders need sufficient, accurate and updated 
information regarding a firm's operations, the financial status, and even the external 
environment. Without these, shareholders cannot make appropriate investment decisions. 
Hence, we expect to see less synchronicity in firms that link managerial compensation to 
performance and pursue actively financial transparency and information disclosure. 
The second type consists of external mechanisms, for example, the external takeover 
market, the legal infrastructure, and product market competition. Among the external 
mechanisms, an active market allows capable managers to gain control of sufficient 
shares in a short period to remove inefficient managers. A series of studies by La Porta et 
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al. (1997, 1998, 1999，2002) emphasize the role played by the legal framework and legal 
foundation in disciplining managers and controlling shareholders' opportunistic behavior. 
These authors find that, in countries with common law tradition, governance standards 
are generally higher and minority shareholders are better protected. In contrast, countries 
pursuing continental law systems normally have poorer minority shareholder protection 
and lower governance standards. Obviously, legal infrastructure is a crucial external 
mechanism to ensure investors to get a fair treatment and return for their investment. 
3.1.1.2 Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
In this section, we will study the effect of changes of the chairman of board and the 
general manager on the firm stock return synchronicity. And it is named 'dynamic 
corporate governance', in contrast to the 'static corporate governance'. There is a large 
literature on the relationship between firm performance and top management turnover in 
the U.S. (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Denis et al. 
1997). These studies are largely based on the first-generation agency theory of the firm 
where managers are agents of dispersed shareholders. And recently a few studies have 
investigated whether countries with different corporate governance mechanisms have a 
similar negative relationship between top executives turnover and firm performance. 
Among the findings, we find one that is most relevant for the present thesis. Top 
executives turnover is negatively related to both stock performance and accounting-based 
firm performance measures. This relationship is stronger when board is dominated by 
outside directors (Weisbach 1988) or in firms with a block shareholder (Denis et al. 1997). 
In other words, poor stock performance as well as poor sales and earnings increase the 
likelihood of executive turnover (Kaplan 1994; Kang and Shivdasani 1995). Hence, we 
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believe that executive turnover should be regarded as the corporate governance 
improvement. 
We treat the chairman of board of directors and the general manager separately as two 
groups. For each group, we decompose the 'changes' into 4 aspects, the reasons of 
leaving the position is corporate governance - related or not; the source of the successor 
is internal or not; the successor takes the position permanently or not; the chairman and 
the general manager are the same person or not. Each aspect above is a potential tool and 
method of corporate governance improvement, which is related to better information 
disclosure mechanisms. 
3.1.2 Regional Governance Mechanisms 
Good regional governance consists of a set of mechanisms to balance the roles of 
government and the market, complete the environment of the market, and stimulate the 
growth of both goods market and factor market. Better regional governance means better 
corporate informational efficiency, so that the firm exhibits less stock return synchronicity. 
To explain these relationships, we should find some appropriate variables for 
measurement. 
Many researchers in and out realized that the market reform in China made its economy 
more active and more efficient, and market reform is the engine to keep China's economy 
developing rapidly (Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, 1992; Cai and Wang, 2000). However, 
China's rapid economic transformation since 1979 has been accompanied by a stark 
regional disparity with the coastal provinces integrating swiftly into the world markets 
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while inland regions lagging far behind in the industrialization process. The growth 
imbalance has placed China's provinces into different stages of development and called 
for different policy responses to deal with different challenges they are facing. Similarly, 
a national policy initiated by the central government is likely to be interpreted and 
implemented in different ways when local governments take into consideration the 
different conditions in their localities. Therefore, studying interactions among the 
provincial economies would be extremely valuable for policy makers and researchers. 
As for China's marketalization progress, different methods, aspects and opinions exist 
academically. For example, Zhongyuan Lu and Angang Hu tried to explain China's 
marketalization progress through four aspects, the investment, consumer price, 
productivity and commerce; Haibing Gu emphasized the effects of factor market to 
market reform; Furen Dong (2001) tried to explain the market reform in four levels, the 
liberalization of markets, the regularity of markets, the legal environment of markets and 
the internationalization of markets, respectively. For the above research, they all have one 
feature in common: they focus on the price and resource allocation mechanisms, but 
neglect the government function and the legal environment of the market. Gang Fan et al. 
(2001, 2003) present that the absolute marketalization process can hardly be measured, 
however, to measure the relative marketalization process among regions is totally feasible. 
They contributed a measurement system which contains 5 aspects and 25 fundamental 
indices, to measure and compare the marketalization process in difference provinces in 
China. The 5 aspects consist of the development of the non-state economy, the 
relationship between the government and the market, the growth of the goods market, the 
growth of the factor market, and the legal environment of the market. This measurement 
is widely adopted by recent researchers, especially the National Economic Research 
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Institute (NERI). Because of NERI, this measurement is also named NERI indices. In this 
thesis, we will also adopt these NERI indices as regional independent variables. 
3.2 Quantification of Independent Variables 
3.2.1 Quantifying Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
3.2.1.1 Quantifying Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
In this section, we start to quantify some corporate governance variables. Firstly, we 
denote the stake of the largest shareholders as largest—stake. We use this variable to 
measure the largest shareholder's interest in a company and also the largest shareholder's 
power on the board. Although the effects of this variable on stock return synchronicity is 
complicated, since listed companies are still young in China, we believe that increasing 
ownership concentration from a low level addresses the free-rider problem among 
shareholders so that it has a negative effect. 
Regarding financial transparency, most listed companies in China are audited by local 
accounting firms, which are not reliable compared to foreign accounting firms, especially 
the big four accounting firms internationally. However, companies issuing H shares, 
which are listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and companies issuing B shares, which 
are mainly for the foreign investors traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 
must adopt international accounting standards, which have better information disclosure 
mechanisms. We take a dummy variable that equals 1 if a company has H shares traded in 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or B shares traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchange, 
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and 0 otherwise. And we denote this dummy variable b&h. We expect to see less 
synchronicity in firms that link managerial compensation to performance and pursue 
actively financial transparency and information disclosure. 
We measure the market for corporate control by the concentration of shares from to 
the IQth largest shareholders. We take the natural logarithm of the sum of squares of the 
percentage points of shareholding by the 2 " � t o the largest shareholders and denote it 
lnsq2_10. We expect this variable to have a negative effect on the stock return 
synchronicity for two reasons. Firstly, large shareholders other than the largest 
shareholders will have incentives to monitor the largest shareholder, and they will have 
more concerns about the firm-specific stuff to raise their return. Secondly, the efficiency 
of the market for corporate control is enhanced because these large shareholders can 
either initiate a fight for corporate control or assist an outsider's fight when the 
management always just paces the market but does not have its own characteristics to 
outperform. Therefore, the higher is the concentration of the shares in the hands of these 
shareholders, the less should be the stock return synchronicity. 
We consider one more variable to indicate whether or not the largest shareholder is the 
government.'^ The governments will probably have conflicting goals with the markets, 
such as maintaining employment and social stability, but not pursuing the profit 
maximization. A controlling government shareholder can use the listed company as a 
vehicle to achieve these policy goals even though they may conflict with shareholders' 
interests (Bai et al., 2000). Therefore, we take a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
largest shareholder is government and 0 otherwise, and denote it gvntjctrl. And we 
4 The state-controlling shareholder also includes legal-person shares that are controlled by various levels of 
governments. 
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expect this variable to have positive effects on the stock return synchronicity. 
3.2.1.2 Quantifying Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
To study the dynamic corporate governance mechanisms, we firstly bring the dummy 
variable denoted as chg. This dummy variable takes value 1 if the changes of chairman or 
the general manager happened in one particular year, and 0 otherwise. This is a key 
variable, because all the variables I will introduce below are set up conditional on this 
chg variable. We expect that this variable will have a negative impact on the stock return 
synchronicity because of several reasons. Firstly, when an agent just gets on board, he 
himself would be willing to do something new for his own interests, because he has to 
prove himself so that he could hold the position longer. Secondly, when a new agent gets 
in a company, the members of the board of directors would like to see various new 
changes to improve the market value, which is an intangible pressure for the new agent to 
push him to do what the directors would like to see. Finally, the directors can hardly trust 
an agent who is new for the position, and surely, they will keep their eyes on him. Under 
a high pressure like this, the agent will definitely try his best to do some more 
firm-specific improvements for the company. 
The next variable we considered is the reason of leaving position for the chairman of the 
board of directors and the general manager. According to CSMAR (China Stock Market 
& Accounting Research) Database, the reasons of leaving position are divided into 12 
different reasons, and valued them from 1 to 12, where l=changes of work assignment: 
the predecessor was removed from the position because of being assigned another 
position; 2=retirement: the predecessor no longer held the position because of retirement 
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or age; 3=expiration of the term of office: the predecessor no longer held the position 
because the term of office is reached; 4=change of the controlling shareholder: when the 
controlling shareholder changes, the general manager or president representing the 
former controlling shareholder may also be replaced; 5=resignation: the predecessor 
voluntarily resigned the position for unknown reasons; 6=dismissal: a listed company 
dismissed the predecessor for unknown reasons; 7=health related reason: the predecessor 
no longer held the position because of poor health, including death; 8=personal reason: 
the predecessor no longer held the position because of personal reasons; 9=corporate 
governance improvement: improving corporate governance led to the predecessor no 
longer holding the position; 10=litigation involved: the predecessor was removed from 
office because of involving in a case; ll=others; 12=end of being the acting general 
manager or president: the predecessor holding the position as an acting general manager 
or president no longer exercised the duty because the term of office is reached. Based on 
the sorts by CSMAR Database, we find reason number 2, 3, 7, 8，11 and 12, namely, 
retirement, expiration of term of office, health related reason, personal reason, others and 
end of proxy, have one thing in common. These reasons of leaving are not related to the 
corporate governance. And we denote these normal reasons of leaving conditional on 
change as chg一nonnal, which means the chairman or the general manager changed and 
the reasons of leaving are normal ones. On the other hand, reason number 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 and 
10，namely, changes of work assignment, change of share-controlling right, resignation, 
dismissal, corporate governance improvement and litigation involved, are related to the 
corporate governance improvements. And we denoted these abnormal reasons of leaving 
conditional on change as chg一abnormal, which means the chairman or the general 
manager changed and the reasons of leaving are abnormal ones. We forecast that the 
chg—normal would not have a significant effect on synchronicity, however, the 
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chg—abnormal would have a negative significant effect on it. 
If a chairman or general manager leaves, w e not only concern about the reasons of 
leaving, but also care about the source of successor. W e distinguish the source of 
successor as internal source and external source. If the successor previously held a 
position at the listed company, such a case would be regarded as internal source, 
otherwise external source. W e denote the internal source conditional on change as 
chg—internal, which means the chairman or the general manager changed and the 
successor held a position at the listed company before. O n the other hand, w e denote 
three external sources conditional on change as chg-external, which means the chairman 
or the general manager changed and the successor was coining from other companies. W e 
believe a successor from outside companies would bring a bigger shock than the one 
from the same company. Hence, w e predict that chg一external would have a negative 
significant effect on synchronicity. 
Whether the successor takes the position temporarily or takes the position permanently 
should be seriously different for some reasons. Firstly, if the successor knows that he 
would just be an agent for the position, he would not have as many incentives as 
permanently taking the position to make the company more firm-specific. Secondly, since 
the successor is a proxy, he would not have enough time to do a systematic plan for the 
company. Even he does, the less time would not allow him to complete it. Finally, the 
board of directors would expect less when knowing the successor would just take the 
position temporarily instead of permanently, and the requirements would be less 
demanding. Based on the preliminary analysis above, w e believe that whether the 
successor is a proxy or not would tell us a completely different story. W e denote the 
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circumstance that a successor takes the position temporarily conditional on change as 
chgjfagent_yes, which means the chairman or the general manager changed and the 
successor would take the position temporarily as a proxy. W e denote the circumstance 
that a successor takes the position permanently, conditional on change as chgJfagent—no, 
which means the chairman or the general manager changed and the successor would take 
the position as a permanent job. Although w e cannot expect the sign of chg_ifagent_yes, 
w e predict the effect on this variable to stock return synchronicity would not be 
significant. A n d w e forecast the chgJfagent_no would have a negative and significant 
effect on stock return synchronicity. 
W e denote the circumstance that the chairman and the general manager are the same 
person, conditional on change as chg_indep_no, which means the chairman and the 
general manager both changed. Further, w e denote the circumstance that the chairman 
and the general manager are not the same person, conditional on change as 
chg_indep_yes, which means the chairman or the general manager changed. And w e 
expect that chg_indep_no has more significant negative effects on stock return 
synchronicity, because changing both the chairman and the general manager would have 
a bigger shock. 
3.2.2 Quantifying Regional Governance Mechanisms 
In this section, w e start to quantify some regional governance variables. W e denote the 
relationship between the government and the market as gov_mkt_rel. This variable is to 
measure the market power in the allocation of resources and the extent of the government 
interference in the market. Besides, it also measures the burden to the market and the 
society caused by a large-scaled government. According to Gang Fan (2000, 2001, 2002, 
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2003)，the closer the relationship between the government and the market is in a province, 
the less value will be taken for this variable. Besides, the higher the extent of the 
government interference in the market, the more effects of government policies on the 
firm operation there would be. As government policies and interference affect all firms, 
the corporate fundamentals of listed companies will show similar characteristics or 
movement. This would lead to a higher extent of return comovement. Hence, we expect a 
negative relationship between this variable and the stock return synchronicity. 
We denote the state of the development of the non-state economy as non_sta_econ. According 
to Gang Fan (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), the more flourishing the non-state economy is in a 
province, the more value will be taken for this variable. According to Xiaolu Wang 
(2003), non-state economy takes 2/3 weight of the whole national economy, especially in 
the industries of architecture, transportation, and food; however, it is still infirm in the 
service industries like telecommunication, finance and insurance. Hence, we cannot have 
an affirmative expectation if non-state economy has a significant positive or negative 
effect on stock return synchronicity. 
During the economic transformation in China for more than 20 years, the goods market 
has been becoming more and more essential. Before the reform, the prices of most goods 
were controlled by the government. By year 2000, this percentage slumped to 10%. The 
development of the goods market also refers to the decrease of the local government 
protection of the local market. We will denote the growth of goods market as 
gds一mkt_ext. And we expect this variable would have a negative effect on stock return 
synchronicity. 
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We denote the growth of the factor market as fac_mkt一ext. This variable is to measure 
the openness of the capital market, labor market and the usage of homeland resources. 
According to Gang Fan (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), the more flourishing the factor market 
is, the more value will be taken for this variable. A better developed factor market means 
a better developed capital market, which surely has a better market information efficiency 
disclosure system, and would lead to a less extent of return comovement. In China, the 
development of the goods and factor markets means the shrinking government 
interference with the business sector. This will reduce the influence of government 
policies on firm operation, which will in turn reduce the synchronicity of stock returns. 
In the financial market, the competition among banks has already commenced. However, 
the interest rate has not been fully marketalized, and the range of the market competition 
is still limited. Most of the credit business is controlled by the state-owned banks. In year 
2000, the short-term loan to the non-state enterprises just took 22% of the total short-term 
loan in China, which implied that non-state enterprises were still confronted with many 
financing difficulties. 
To measure the ratio of barristers and accountants to total population in a specific 
province, and the extent of the legal environment, we denote the development of the 
intermediary organizations and the legal environment in markets as mkt一agt_lgl. The 
more completed the legal environment is, the more value will be taken for this variable. 
From the survey by Gang Fan (2003), the unbalanced development of the agency 
organizations in markets and the legal environment is prevailing in different provinces of 
China. Because the outstanding jurisdiction justice, transparency and the efficiency are 
directly related to the outperforming market functioning mechanisms, this variable is very 
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important. And this variable indirectly measures the development of legal institutions 
across regions. As legal institution development will improve corporate governance and 
thus corporate information disclosure, we expect that this variable has a negative impact 
on the stock return synchronicity. 
3.2.3 Quantifying Control Variables 
To study the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on stock return synchronicity, 
we need to control some variables which are not corporate governance variables, but with 
strong firm-specific characteristics, such as total assets and book value leverage. We 
denote natural logarithm of total assets of a listed company as lg_tot_asst, and denote the 
book value leverage of a listed company as book—value—lev. What is more, we think 
different industries have different features and different provinces have different policies. 
To get a more accurate result, we also set up a series of dummy variables consisting of 13 
industry codes and 31 province codes. 
As for studying the effects of regional governance mechanisms on the stock return 
synchronicity, we need to control the corporate governance variables, firm-specific 
characteristics, and the regional characteristics. Corporate governance variables are 
referring to b&h, gvnt_ctrl, largest—stake and lnsq2_10. Firm-specific characteristics are 
tot_asst, book_value_lev, and tq as which we denote Tobin's Q. Besides, we bring some 
new variables to measure regional characteristics which include natural logarithm of per 
capita GDP, the ratio of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) to GDP, the ratio of total trade 
output to GDP, and the ratio of total industrial output to GDP. And we denote them as 
Ig_pcgdp, fdi/gdp, trade/gdp, and ind/gdp respectively. They mainly reflect the economic 
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development and the openness of different regions. We expect them to have negative 
effects on stock return synchronicity. After controlling corporate governance mechanisms, 
firm-specific characteristics and regional characteristics, we also need to control the 
industry and province fixed effects. 
Chapter 4. Data 
4.1 Sample 
Our data is mainly from China Stock Market & Accounting Research Dataset (CSMAR), 
and China Marketlization Index Dataset (Gang Fan, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), 
complemented by useful information from China Listed Company Yearbook, and 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The sample includes all listed companies on 
both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1999 and 2002. 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the static corporate governance variables. 
Neither dual listing nor multiple listing is common for Chinese listed companies since the 
average proportion of companies issuing H or B shares is less than 5%. About 40% of the 
listed companies are controlled by the government. The controlling shareholder in each 
company holds a significantly large stake of shares as the mean of the largest 
shareholder's holding is 44.14% and the highest value is 88.58%. The mean and the 
standard deviation for the concentration of the second to the tenth largest shareholders are 
3.34 and 2.68, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
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Table 2 and Table 3 report the summary statistics for the dynamic corporate governance 
variables. Generally, 22.3% of companies changed their chairmen and 18.5% of 
companies changed their general managers. The proportion of normal changing reasons 
for chairmen and general managers is low, only 3.3% and 2.8% respectively, compared 
with the corporate governance - related one, which is 6.5% and 7.3% respectively. 
Internal source is preferred for the successor of chairman, which takes place in 11.7% and 
the external source only takes 9.8%. However, external source is slightly preferred for the 
successor of general manager, which takes place in 8.5% and the internal source only 
takes 9.8%. The probability of temporary changes for chairman and the general manager 
is surprisingly small, only 0.9% and 0.4%. Most of the successors take the position 
permanently. 21.4% of changes are permanent for the chairman position, and 18.3% for 
the general manager position. 
[Insert Table 2 and 3 Here] 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics for regional governance. The mean and the 
variance of the relationship between the government and the market is 6.74 and 1.49 
respectively, and the highest value is 9.18. The mean of the extent of the non-state 
economy is 6.75, and the highest value is 12.05. The mean the growth of goods market is 
7.99 and the one of factor market is 4.62, which implies goods market is better developed 
than the factor market. The mean and the variance of the development of the intermediary 
organizations and the legal environment in markets is 5.94 and 1.84 respectively, and the 
highest value is 11.04. 
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[Insert Table 4 Here] 
4.2 Definitions of Main Synchronicity Measures 
To measure the individual stock return synchronicity, we adopt the methodology of 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and Li, Morck, Yang and Yeung (2003) by measuring the 
synchronicity of stock price movement in each province or the average magnitude of 
firm-specific variation in stock returns in each region. A higher degree of synchronicity 
of stock price movement indicates a smaller amount of firm-specific variation in stock 
return, and thus a lower level of informational efficiency of stock price. 
Since we are interested in investigating the effect of the average level of informational 
efficiency of listed companies in each region on the quota allocation to listed companies 
in that region, we need to calculate the regional average synchronicity of stock price 
movement or regional average magnitude of firm-specific variation in stock return. To do 
so, we start by assessing the synchronicity of individual stock i in year t. We use the 
following model: 
r - n + h r^l 画 ghai 1 Shenzhen & � + + 6 1 + 6 
Ut - “ j 十 卞 卞 " 3 / L A t / S ’ / 卞 CfAS,?�卞 ^aA'hKj 卞匕H K , t 广匕it 
1 . ., ‘ . . J ‘ Shanghai Shenzhen � i , . , 
where 巧,is iirm i s return in period t,厂…, and 厂爪, are Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock market index return in period t respectively, ^us,t and ^HK,t are U.S. 
and Hong Kong stock market index return respectively, and are the rate 
of change in the exchange rate between RMB and US dollar or Hong Kong dollar 
respectively, and e“ is the disturbance term. For each year, we use the weekly data on 
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individual stock return, stock market index return and exchange rate change to conduct 
regressions. Calculating from this regression for firm i in year t, we can obtain R“ and 
SST.^ for all companies from one particular province. And we will use R“ as the 
dependent variable in the consequent regression models. 
4.3 Methodology 
We employ three groups of variables and three estimation methods — ordinary least 
squares (OLS), fixed-effects (FE), and random-effects (RE) using the four-year panel 
data set. We estimate both a fixed-effects model and a ramdom-effects model because the 
fixed-effects model mitigates the endogeneity problem, however, some of the corporate 
governance variables are time-invariant and their effects cannot be estimated by a 
fixed-effects model. On the other hand, the random-effects model does solve this problem, 
which allows us to estimate the impact of these time-invariant variables. A general form 
of the OLS regression model is as follows, 
R^=a + b�Xit+e “ 
where X“ includes all the independent variables and the control variables for each 
group a is constant term, and e“ is random error. 
In terms of fixed effects regression, we set up a general form as below, 
Where a. is the fixed-effects term, g^  is year fixed effects, and e.^  is random error. 
Clearly, this regression model controls for firm-specific and the province-specific fixed 
effects as well as year fixed effects. 
27 
A general form of the random effects regression model is as follows, 
Ri=q+“�+gt+b，Xit+hj+e “ 
Where u. is the random disturbance characterizing the i-th firm or the i-th province,容， 
is the constant year effects, q is constant term, hj is the province-fixed effect, and e“ is 
random error. 
Chapter 5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Results on Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
5.1.1 Results on Static Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
In this section, we investigate empirically the effects of the chosen static corporate 
governance mechanisms on the firm stock return synchronicity. We use R“ as 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables include four static corporate governance 
variables, b&h, gvnt_ctd, largest—stake and lnsq2_10, together with lg_tot_asst, 
book—value-lev, tq, lg_pcgdp, fid/gdp, trade/gdp, ind/gdp, industry dummies and 
province dummies as control variables. 
Our results, presented in Table 5, provide empirical evidence to evaluate our hypotheses. 
For the OLS model, if a company has H shares traded in Hong Kong Stock Exchange, or 
B shares traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock exchange, it is estimated to have a 
negative and significant effect on the stock return synchronicity. The coefficient of 
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gvntjctrl is positive and not statistically significant. Hence, we find the expected positive 
relationship between gvnt_ctrl and the stock return synchronicity, although not significant. 
The coefficient of the largest—stake is negative and statistically significant, and the 
coefficient of lnsq2_10 is also negative and statistically significant at 1% level. For the 
largest—stake’ we mentioned that the effects are complicated, which can be either positive 
or negative. Since the coefficient is 0.0056032 and the t-value is only 0.84, we can say 
that this is a reasonable result. The result of lnsq2_10 also supports our hypothesis. 
Among the three firm-specific characteristic control variables, lg_tot_asst, 
book—value—lev, and tq, the leverage ratio of the firm has a statistically significant 
positive effect on firm stock return synchronicity, while Tobin's Q and total assets have 
statistically significant negative effects. And, for the regional characteristic control 
variables, lg_pcgdp, fdi/gdp, trade/gdp and ind/gdp’ the ind/gdp has a statistically 
negative effect on firm stock return synchronicity, but the other three variables have signs 
opposite to our prediction. 
For the Fixed effects model, all the results are consistent with the OLS ones except for 
the gvntjctrl one. The coefficient of gvnt_ctrl is becoming negative and still not 
statistically significant. The coefficient is -0.0110724, and the t-value is only -0.38. It 
implies that after controlling some characteristics not observable, the relationship 
between gvnt_ctrl and the stock return synchronicity becomes negative, but which is not 
significant. And we think this is also a reasonable result. In summary, the results from the 
fixed-effects regression using Tobin's q are robust and consistent with the predictions 
from the theory of corporate governance. 
The random-effects model allows us to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables. 
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We find that the concentration of shares from the to the largest shareholders has a 
statistically significant negative effect on stock return synchronicity. And all the results 
are consistent with the ones of the OLS model, which confirms our theoretical 
predictions. 
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
We think that some potential problems in interpreting these results should be mentioned. 
First, since we have more than ten regressors, multicollinearity might be a problem. 
However, most of the regressors are statistically significant. Second, a potential 
endogeneity problem might exist; the fixed-effects model mitigates but does not fully 
solve this potential problem. 
5.1.2 Results on Dynamic Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
5.1.2.1 Results on President-Changing Variables 
In this section, we investigate empirically the effects of the chosen president-changing 
corporate governance mechanisms on the firm stock return synchronicity. We use R“ as 
dependent variable. The explanatory variables include nine president-changing variables, 
chg, chg_normal, chg_abnormal, chg_internal, chg—external, chg_ifagent_yes, 
chgjfagent_no, chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no, together with industry dummies and 
province dummies as control variables. Because the four-pair variables are decomposed 
by the chg, and they are observed conditional on chg, we cannot put all these variables 
together in one regression model, otherwise, multicollinearity may exist. Hence, we put 
chg and the other four-pair variables into the regression models separately. 
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Our results, presented in Table 6, provide empirical evidence to evaluate our hypotheses. 
For the OLS model, if a chairman of a company has changed, it is estimated to have a 
negative and significant effect at 1% level on the stock return synchronicity. This means 
that when a chairman of a firm is changed, the stock return synchronicity of this firm will 
significantly become less. The coefficients of both chg_normal and chg_abnormal are 
negative and statistically significant, however, the absolute value of the coefficient of 
chg—abnormal is bigger than that of chg—normal, and also, the absolute value of the 
t-value of chg-abnormal is bigger than that of chg_normal. This implies that the 
corporate governance related changing reasons have more negative effects on stock return 
synchronicity. The coefficient of chg—internal is -0.0013816, and not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the coefficient of chg—external is -0.0349178, and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Clearly, this means that if a successor is from the 
same company, it would be almost unrelated to the stock return synchronicity, and if a 
successor is from other companies, it would have significant negative effects on stock 
return synchronicity. As for the pair of chg_ifagent_yes and chg_ifagent—no, the result is 
also consistent with our hypothesis. The coefficient of chg_ifagent_yes is positive and not 
significant, and the coefficient of chg—ifagent—no is -0.0174446 and significant at 1% 
level. This implies that if a successor takes the position temporarily, the synchronicity 
might be slightly bigger, and if a successor takes the position permanently, the 
synchronicity is significantly becoming less. The last pair is chg_indep_yes and 
chg_indep_no. Since 'independent' here means that the chairman and the general manger 
are not the same person, chg_indep_yes means either chairman or the general manager 
changed. For here, it just means the chairman changed. Similarly, chg_indep_no means 
both the chairman and the general manager changed. The results mostly fit our hypothesis. 
Although the coefficients of both variables are negative and statistically significant, 
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chg_indep_no has a bigger effect on stock return synchronicity. 
For the fixed-effects model, the results are mostly different from the ones of OLS model. 
The chg still has a negative effect. However, it is not statistically significant. The 
coefficients of both chg—normal and chg—abnormal are negative, and not statistically 
significant. The result of the pair of chg—internal and chg—external surprises us. The 
coefficient of the former one becomes significantly negative at 1% level, and the one of 
the latter one changes from negative to positive, and not statistically significant at 1% 
level. The result of chg_ifagent_yes and chg_ifagent_no also becomes quite different. 
The effect of the former one turns to be significantly negative from positive, and the 
effect of the latter one is still negative, however becoming not statistically significant 
from significant at 1% level. The last pair is chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no. They still 
have negative effects as they do in OLS model. However, both of them become not 
statistically significant. In summary, we think there must be a factor that is unobservable, 
so that after controlling this factor in the FE model, we have different results from the 
ones of OLS model. However, we do not have a more satisfying explanation for that. 
The random-effects model allows us to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables. 
And we find that the coefficients of chg, chg—abnormal，chg_ifagent_no and 
chg_indep_no are all negative and statistically significant at 1% level. Most results are 
consistent with the ones of the OLS model, which confirms our theoretical predictions. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
5.1.2.2 Results on General manager-change Variables 
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In this section, we investigate empirically the effects of the chosen general 
manager-change corporate governance mechanisms on the firm stock return synchronicity. 
The methodology is exactly the same as the one we used in the study of president 
changes. We use RI as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables include nine 
general manager-changing variables, chg, chg一normal，chg—abnormal，chg—internal’ 
chg一external, chg_ifagent_yes, chg_ifagent一no，chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no, 
together with industry dummies and province dummies as control variables. Because the 
four-pair variables are decomposed by the chg, and they are observed conditional on chg, 
we cannot put all these variables together in one regression model, otherwise, 
multicollinearity may exist. Hence, we put chg and the other four-pair variables into the 
regression models separately. 
Our results, presented in Table 7, provide empirical evidence to evaluate our hypotheses. 
For the OLS model, if a general manager of a company has changed, it would be 
estimated to have a negative and significant effect at 1% level on the stock return 
synchronicity. This means that when a general manager of a firm is changed, the stock 
return synchronicity of this firm will significantly become less. The coefficients of both 
chg—normal and chg-abnormal are negative and statistically significant. The coefficient 
of chg_intemal is -0.0101332, and not statistically significant. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of chg—external is -0.0502266, and statistically significant at 1% level. Clearly, 
this means that if a successor is from the same company, it would be almost unrelated to 
the stock return synchronicity, and if a successor is from other companies, it would have 
significant negative effects on stock return synchronicity. As for the pair of 
chg_ifagent_yes and chg_ifagent_no, the result is also consistent with our hypothesis. 
The coefficient of chg_ifagent_yes is positive and not significant, and the coefficient of 
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chg—if agent_no is -0.0336796 and significant at 1% level. This implies that if a successor 
takes the position temporarily, the synchronicity might be slightly bigger, and if a 
successor takes the position permanently, the synchronicity is significantly becoming less. 
The last pair is chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no. Since ‘independent，here means that 
the chairman and the general manger are not the same person, chg_indep_yes means 
either chairman or the general manager changed. For here, it just means the general 
manager changed. Similarly, chg_indep_no means both the chairman and the general 
manager changed. The results mostly fit our hypothesis. Although the coefficients of both 
variables are negative and statistically significant, chg_indep_no has a bigger effect on 
stock return synchronicity. 
For the fixed-effects model, the results are mostly different from the ones of OLS model. 
The chg still has a negative but insignificant effect. The coefficients of both chg—normal 
and chg—abnormal are negative, and not statistically significant. The result of the pair of 
chg一internal and chg—external is also negative but not statistically significant. The result 
of chg_ifagent_yes and chg_ifagent_no also becomes quite different. The effect of the 
former one turns to be negative from positive, and the effect of the latter one is still 
negative, however becoming not statistically significant from zero at 1% level. The last 
pair is chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no. The former one becomes positive from 
significantly negative at 5% level, and the latter one remains negative but not statistically 
significant. In summary, we think there must be a factor that is unobservable, so that after 
controlling this factor in the FE model, we have different results from the ones of OLS 
model. However, we do not have a more satisfying explanation for that. 
The random-effects model allows us to estimate the impact of time-in variant variables. 
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And we find that the coefficients of chg, chg—abnormal，chg—external，chg_ifagent—no 
and chg_indep_no are all negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. All results 
here are consistent with the ones of the OLS model, which confirms our theoretical 
predictions. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
5.2 Results on Regional Governance Mechanisms 
In this section, we investigate empirically the effects of the chosen regional governance 
mechanisms on the firm stock return synchronicity. We use R^ as dependent variable. 
The independent variables include five regional governance variables, gov_mkt_rel, 
non_sta_econ, gds_mkt_ext, fct—mkt_ext and mkt_agt—lgl. Other explanatory variables 
include four corporate governance variables, b&h, gvnt_ctrl, largest—stake and lnsq2—10, 
three firm-specific characteristics, tot_asst’ leverage and tq, four regional characteristics, 
lg_pcgdp, fdi/gdp, trade/gdp and ind/gdp, together with industry dummies and province 
dummies as control variables. 
Table 8 presents the correlation among five regional governance variables, and we find 
that mostly the variables are highly-correlated. Hence, we put each regional governance 
variable into the regression models seperately. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
Our results, presented in Table 9, provide empirical evidence to evaluate our hypotheses. 
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For the OLS model, the coefficients of gov一mkt—rel, fct_mkt_ext and non—sta—econ are 
negative, and the former two are statistically significant; the coefficients of gds—mkt—ext 
and mkt_agt_lgl are positive, and not statistically significant. The results are mostly 
consistent with our hypotheses. However, we do not have a satisfying explanation why 
the coefficient of mkt—agt—lgl is positive. As for the corporate governance variables, the 
coefficients of b&h, largest—stake and lnsq2_10 are all significantly negative. And the 
gvnt_ctrl has an insignificantly positive effect on stock return synchronicity. The results 
are consistent with our hypotheses. The results of firm-specific characteristics and the 
regional characteristics are mostly not significant. 
For the fixed-effects model, only the fct_mkt_ext has a significantly negative effect at 1% 
level. Although the coefficient of mkt_agt_lgl is negative, the t-value is only -0.15. The 
coefficients of other three variables, gov_mkt_rel, non—sta—econ and gds_mkt_ext all turn 
out to be positive; however, the t-value is less than one. As for the corporate governance 
variables, the coefficients of b&h, largest—stake and lnsq2_10 are all significantly 
negative. And the gvnt_ctrl has a not significantly positive effect on stock return 
synchronicity. The results of firm-specific characteristics and the regional characteristics 
are similar to those of OLS, mostly not significant. 
The random-effects model allows us to estimate the impact of time-invariant variables. 
The coefficient of gov_mkt_rel is -0.0048634, and the t-value is -1.62, which means that 
it is almost statistically significant at 10% level. The effect of non_sta_econ to stock 
return synchronicity becomes negative again; however, it is still not significant. The 
coefficients of gds_mkt_ext and mkt_agt_lgl are positive, but both not statistically 
significant. The effect of fct_mkt_ext on stock return synchronicity remains significantly 
negative in the random-effects model. The coefficients of corporate governance variables 
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are mostly significantly negative except for the gvnt_ctrL The results of firm-specific 
characteristics and the regional characteristics are mostly not significant. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
We analyze empirically the impact of four static corporate governance, nine dynamic 
corporate governance and five regional governance measures on the stock return 
synchronicity of listed companies in China with standard control variables included. We 
take Rft as the measure of firm stock return synchronicity. We use a four-year panel 
data set and estimate both fixed-effects and random-effects model. In this paper we 
document statistically strong effects of static and dynamic corporate governance 
measures and regional governance mechanisms on stock return synchronicity. And we 
find very strong empirical support for our main hypotheses that there are negative 
relationships between static corporate governance quality and stock return synchronicity, 
between dynamic corporate governance mechanisms and stock return synchronicity, and 
between regional governance quality and stock return synchronicity. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, we find that high concentration of shareholding among the second 
to the tenth largest shareholders, issuing shares to foreign investors and the high stake 
holding by largest shareholders have statistically significant and negative effects on stock 
return synchronicity. In addition, if the chairman or the general manger changes, it would 
have statistically significant and negative effects on stock return synchronicity. After 
decomposing the chairman or the general manger-changing variables, we find that the 
corporate governance-related leaving reasons are more effectible than non-corporate 
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governance-related ones on stock return synchronicity; external successors are more 
effective than internal successors; taking the position permanently is more effective than 
taking the position temporarily; independent board is more effective than if it is not. For 
the regional governance mechanisms, we find that the closer the relationship between the 
government and the market is, the higher the stock return synchronicity is. And the better 
development of the capital market, the less the stock return synchronicity. As we have 
shown, the statistical significance of these effects remains robust across all specifications, 
although a few of them do fluctuate depending on the estimation method employed. 
These findings have implications for the listed companies, market regulators and regional 
governments in China. Our study sheds light on the relative importance of various 
corporate governance and regional governance practices; hence, this provides useful 
information to the Chinese regulatory authorities to design better practice codes tailored 
to both the Chinese institutional background and the current level of capital 
marketlization in China. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Summary statistics for the static corporate governance variables 
largest_stake - the stake of largest shareholders; lnsq2_10 - the natural logarithm of the sum of squares of 
the percentage points of shareholding by the 2"'' to the 10'^  largest shareholders; b & h - d u m m y variable that 
equals 1 if a company has H or B shares listed; gvnt_ctrl - d u m m y variable that equals 1 if the largest 
shareholder is government; lg_tot_asst - the natural logarithm of the total assets; book—value—lev - book 
value leverage 
Year Variable N o of obs. Mean S.D. Min. M a x 
1999 b & h 1266 0.0331754 0.179165 0 1 
gvnt_ctrl 913 0.388828 0.4877513 0 1 
largest—stake 913 45.58441 18.01564 0.409 88.58 
lnsq2_To 912 3.320349 2.592005 -4.068677 7.439829 
lg_tot_asst 908 20.75436 0.8356283 18.62417 24.01761 
book_value_lev 908 0.4640941 0.4157267 0 3.424701 
2000 b & h 1266 0.0331754 0.179165 0 1 
gvnt_ctrl 1050 0.3809524 0.4858523 0 1 
largest_stake 1050 44.92357 17.7692 2.14 88.58 
lnsq2_To 1050 3.226426 2.771252 -5.278515 7.273031 
lg_tot_asst 1044 20.89748 0.8221936 18.55607 24.38597 
book_valueJev 1044 0.4733614 0.729082 0 18.27407 
2001 b & h 1266 0.0331754 0.179165 0 1 
gvnt_ctrl 1299 0.3560673 0.4790476 0 1 
largest_stake 1299 43.51003 18.59547 1.79 85 
lnsq2_To 1299 3.330789 2.778561 -7.763422 7.278126 
lg_tot_asst 1125 20.97567 0.8711131 17.70658 26.61019 
book_value_lev 1125 0.5219496 0.5591838 0 7.553745 
2002 b & h 1266 0.0331754 0.179165 0 1 
gvnt_ctrl 1198 0.3238731 0.4681477 0 1 
largest—stake 1198 42.53778 18.46997 0 85 
lnsq2_To 1171 3.485772 2.578874 -8.149084 8.086329 
lg_tot_asst 1188 21.0318 0.9176149 17.55338 26.63237 
book_value_lev 1188 0.615108 1.106224 0 24.34775 
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Table 2 Summary statistics for the dynamic corporate governance variables 
(Chairman) 
chg - d u m m y variable that takes value 1 if the changes of chairman or the general manager happened in 
one particular year; chg_normal — normal reasons of leaving conditional on change; chg_abnormal -
abnormal reasons of leaving conditional on change; chgjntemal - internal successor; chg_extemal -
external successor; chg_ifagent_yes - successor takes the position temporarily conditional on change; 
chg_ifagent_no - successor takes the position permanently conditional on change; chg_indep_no - the 
chairman and the general manager is the same person; chg_indep_yea - the chairman and the general 
manager is not the same person 
Year Variable No. of obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
1999 chg 1266 0.1966825 0.3976473 0 1 
Chg_normal 1266 0.0371248 0.1891423 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0663507 0.2489925 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.121643 0.3270022 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.0758294 0.2648295 0 1 
Chg—ifagent—yes 1266 0.0047393 0.0687067 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.1919431 0.3939842 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.1366509 0.3504479 0 1 
ChgJndep_no 1266 0.0600316 0.1967031 0 1 
2000 chg 1266 0.2345972 0.4239142 0 1 
Chg_normal 1266 0.0236967 0.1521625 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0592417 0.2361698 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.1453397 0.3525822 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.0892575 0.2852277 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.0039494 0.0627452 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.2306477 0.4214138 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.1808847 0.3850747 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.0434439 0.2039348 0 1 
2001 chg 1266 0.2235387 0.416781 0 1 
Chg—normal 1266 0.028436 0.1662806 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0687204 0.253078 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.1184834 0.3233074 0 1 
Chg_external 1266 0.1050553 0.3067458 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.0047393 0.0687067 0 1 
ChgJfagent_no 1266 0.2187994 0.4135956 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.1540284 0.3611187 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.0695103 0.1640216 0 1 
2002 chg 1266 0.235387 0.4244081 0 1 
Chg—normal 1266 0.0434439 0.2039348 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0647709 0.2462185 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.0837283 0.6011352 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.1200632 0.3251639 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.021327 0.5126265 0 1 
Chg—ifagent—no 1266 0.214058 0.4178254 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.1816746 0.3857285 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.0323855 0.1770916 0 1 
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Table 3 Summary statistics for the dynamic corporate governance variables (G. M.) 
chg - d u m m y variable that takes value 1 if the changes of chairman or the general manager happened in 
one particular year; chg—normal - normal reasons of leaving conditional on change; chg_abnormal -
abnormal reasons of leaving conditional on change; chg—internal - internal successor; chg_extemal -
external successor; chg_ifagent_yes - successor takes the position temporarily conditional on change; 
chg_ifagent_no - successor takes the position permanently conditional on change; chg_indep_no - the 
chairman and the general manager is the same person; chg—indep一yea - the chairman and the general 
manager is not the same person 
Year Variable No. of obs. M e a n S.D. Min. M a x . 
1999 chg 1266 0.1753555 0.3804211 0 1 
Chg_normal 1266 0.0300158 0.1706982 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0742496 0.2622803 0 1 
Chg—internal 1266 0.0789889 0.2698281 0 1 
Chg_external 1266 0.0963665 0.2952098 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.0047393 0.0972815 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.1729858 0.3783845 0 1 
Chgjndep_yes 1266 0.0545024 0.2471007 0 1 
Chgjndep.no 1266 0.1105845 0.3137409 0 1 
2000 chg 1266 0.1721959 0.3776998 0 1 
Chg—normal 1266 0.0260664 0.1593956 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0608215 0.239097 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.0853081 0.27945 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.0860979 0.2806195 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.0039494 0.0627452 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.1682464 0.3742328 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.0560821 0.2301712 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.1050553 0.3067458 0 1 
2001 chg 1266 0.1958926 0.3970431 0 1 
Chg_normal 1266 0.0197472 0.1391854 0 1 
Chg_abnormal 1266 0.0797788 0.2710576 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.0963665 0.2994853 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.0995261 0.2994853 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_yes 1266 0.0007899 0.028105 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.1951027 0.3964363 0 1 
Chgjndep_yes 1266 0.0655608 0.2476106 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.100316 0.3005395 0 1 
2002 chg 1266 0.1982622 0.3988483 0 1 
Chg—normal 1266 0.0347551 0.1832314 0 1 
Chg—abnormal 1266 0.0774092 0.2673452 0 1 
Chgjntemal 1266 0.0797788 0.3802873 0 1 
Chg_extemal 1266 0.1105845 0.3137409 0 1 
Chgjfagent_yes 1266 0.0047393 0.2576445 0 1 
Chg_ifagent_no 1266 0.1951027 0.3964363 0 1 
Chg_indep_yes 1266 0.093207 0.2908371 0 1 
Chg_indep_no 1266 0.0876777 0.2829374 0 1 
44 
Table 4 Summary statistics for the regional governance variables 
gov_mkt_rel - the relationship between the government and the market; non_sta_econ — the stake of the 
development of the non-state economy; gds_mkt_ext - the growth of goods market; fac_mkt_ext - the 
growth of the factor market; mkt_agt_lgl - the development of the intermediary organizations and the legal 
environment in markets; lg_pcgdp - natural logarithm of per capital G D P ; fdi/gdp - the ratio of FDI to 
G D P ; trade/gdp - the ratio of total trade output to G D P ; ind/gdp - the ratio of total industrial output to G D P 
^ Variable No. of Mean ^ Mii^ 
o^ 
1999 gov_mkt—rel 1266 6.66831 1.40807 0 8.38 
non_sta_econ 1266 5.782536 2.429541 0 10 
gds_mkt_ext 1266 7.486058 1.710523 0 9.79 
fct_mkt_ext 1266 4.208784 1.899884 0 7.21 
mkt_agt_lgl 1266 5.461461 1.310986 0 7.53 
lg_pcgdp 1266 9.081164 0.5949701 7.80704 10.21736 
fdi/gdp 1249 0.0489475 0.0396235 0.0015355 0.1260107 
trade/gdp 1266 0.433266 0.4709534 0.0316437 1.372865 
ind/gdp 1266 0.866908 0.3176278 0.1418718 1.559587 
2000 gov_mkt_rel 1266 6.636074 1.470055 0 8.37 
non_sta_econ 1266 6.366422 2.356841 0 10.69 
gds_mkt_ext 1266 7.694961 1.592039 0 9.88 
fct_mkt—ext 1266 4.574961 2.120592 0 7.87 
mkt_agt_lgl 1266 5.757038 1.355515 0 7.97 
lg_pcgdp 1266 9.139459 0.5646146 7.943969 10.2105 
fdi/gdp 1258 0.0376822 0.032214 0.0014418 .0998984 
trade/gdp 1266 0.5106669 0.542269 0.0367919 1.65756 
ind/gdp 1266 0.9145193 0.3247275 0.139902 1.589874 
2001 gov_mkt_rel 1266 6.684226 1.488245 -2.22 8.32 
non_sta_econ 1266 6.947773 2.483802 0.59 11.35 
gds_mkt_ext 1266 8.398483 1.221411 3.99 10.02 
fct_mkt_ext 1266 4.78312 2.428654 0.94 8.36 
mkt_agt_lgl 1266 6.084321 2.241165 2.97 10.76 
lg_pcgdp 1266 9.245303 0.5894752 7.95709 10.33118 
fdi/gdp 1249 0.0345179 0.0270768 0.0010652 0.087724 
trade/gdp 1266 0.4948984 0.5093133 0.0408378 1.4997 
ind/gdp 1266 0.9262978 0.3407379 0.1288834 1.597957 
2002 gov_mkt_rel 1266 6.983697 1.573842 -0.98 9.18 
non_sta_econ 1266 7.91609 2.500958 1.4 12.05 
gds_mkt_ext 1266 8.386366 1.312752 3.83 10.15 
fct_mkt_ext 1266 4.918776 2.380378 1.28 8.74 
mkt_agt_lgl 1266 6.460687 2.460963 1.73 11.04 
lg_pcgdp 1266 9.337245 0.5909121 8.035426 10.41285 
fdi/gdp 1258 0.036219 0.0280268 0.001053 0.086019 
trade/gdp 1266 0.5317857 0.5389333 0.0429805 1.554904 
ind/gdp 0.9612578 0.3512436 0.120679 1.620117 
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Table 5 Static corporate governance and stock return synchronicity 
W e use b&h, gvnt_ctrl, largest—stake and lnsq2_10 as the independent variables, lg_tot_asst, 
book—value—lev and tq as the control variables for firm characteristics, and lg_pcgdp, fdi/gdp, trade/gdp 
and ind/gdp as the control variables for regional characteristics. Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial 
Dummies and Province Dummies are included but not reported. 2. * Significance at the 10% level. “ Idem., 
the 5 % * " Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
-0.0358692** -0.0337593* 
b & h -
(-2.23) (-1.77) 
0.0056032 -0.0110724 0.0036205 
e v n t C t r l 
- (0.84) (-0.38) (0.47) 
-0.0005326* -0.0013849** -0.0004476* 
largest-stake 
- (-1.93) (-1.97) (-1.67) 
-0.0075741*** -0.0059297* -0.0071436*** 
lnsq2 10 
一 (-4.95) (-1.73) (-4.27) 
-0.0228262*** -0.1263619*** -0.025576*** 
Ig tot asst 
- (-3.62) (-9.08) (-5.48) 
0.0096613** 0.0105009** 0.0101449** 
book value lev 
— _ (2.01) (2.08) (2.44) 
-0.0682056*** -0.0641737*** -0.0653296*** 
tq (-4.31) (-10.78) (-14.42) 
1.023334*** 1.052771*** 1.020226*** 
l2 pcgdp 
(19.73) (23.66) (24.05) 
1.174743*** 1.167326*** 1.192562*** 
fdi/gdp 
(2.99) (3.21) (3.31) 
0.1520351*** 0.1764118*** 0.1555666*** 
trade/gdp 
(2.70) (3.06) (2.71) 
-0.2107606* -0.1886035* -0.2153769** 
ind/gdp 
(-1.87) (-1.78) (-2.05) 
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Table 6 president-changing variables and stock return synchronicity 
The following table is for president-changing variables and the stock return synchronicity. Firstly, w e use 
chg alone as the independent variable. A n d then w e put 4 pairs of variables into the regression models 
separately, including chg_normal and chg_abnormal, chgjnternal and chg_extemal, chg_ifagent_yes and 
chg_ifagent_no, and chg_indep_yes and chg_indep_no. Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial D u m m i e s 
and Province D u m m i e s are included but not reported. 2. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. ” Idem., the 5 % *** 
Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
-0.0187017*** -0.0087468 -0.0236526*** 
chg (-2.86) (-1.05) (-3.15) 
N o . ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
0 0308871** -0.0113445 -0.0202644 
chg_no 麵 1 • (.2.18) (-0.60) (-1.19) 
-0.0362423*** Q0104942 -0.0356494*** 
(.332) (-0.74) (-2.84) 
N o . ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
. 1 -0.0013816 -0.0239176*** -0.0232032*** 
chgjntemal (_0.19) (-3.01) (-3.17) 
-0.0349178*** 0 008889 -0.0198459* 
chg-ex_al 印： (0.75) (-1.89) 
N o . ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
0.0014458 -0.0217885* -0.0162137 
chg-ifagent一 yes (O.ll) (_1.72) (丄^⑴ 
-0.0174446*** _o 011035 -0.0244724*** 
chg_ifagent_no ( 2 55) (-1.32) (-3.23) 
N o . ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
-0.012991* .0101142 -0.0185265** 
chgjndep_yes ( 口 ① '(-1.09) (-2.21) 
-0.0402633*** . 0256594 -0.0561968*** 
chgjndep 一 no (^；丄） '(-1.38) (-3.38) 
N o . ofobs. ^ ^ _ _ _ 
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Table 7 general manager-change variables and stock return synchronicity 
The following table is for general manager-changing variables and the stock return synchronicity. Firstly, 
w e use chg alone as the independent variable. And then w e put 4 pairs of variables into the regression 
models separately, including chg_normal and chg—abnormal, chgjnternal and chg_extemal, 
chg_ifagent_yes and chg_ifagent_no, and chg_indep—yes and chg_indep_no. Note: 1. The Year Dummies, 
Industrial Dummies and Province Dummies are included but not reported. 2. * Significance at the 10% level. 
** Idem., the 5 % *** Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
-0.033344*** -0.0042592 -0.0295069*** 
chg (-4.83) (-0.47) (-3.65) 
no. ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
00490935*** -0.0303465 -0.0437079** 
c h g _ n o _ l • (.3.02) (-1.46) (-2.34) 
-0.0314201*** _o 0030761 -0.0271958** 
chg-abn_al ⑴） (-0.23) (-2.29) 
no. ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
, . , -0.0101332 -0.0114793 -(X019209* 
(-1.26) (-1.03) (.1.93) 
-0.0502266*** .0 0024809 -0.0383912*** 
c h g - e x t _ l (-554) (-0.21) (-3.65) 
no. ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
, 0 . 0 1 2 6 0 7 7 -0.0290707 -0.0158239 
chg—ifagent_yes (1 16) (-1.23) (-0.74) 
-0.0336796*** _o 0043879 -0.02959*** 
chg_ifagent_no (485) (-0.48) (-3.65) 
no. ofobs. 4223 4223 4223 
-0.0274866** 0.0091058 -0.0082613 
chg_indep_yes 卩々） (0.66) (-0.68) 
-0.0288586*** .q 0185212 -0.0410092*** 
chg-indeP-nc^ (3 31) (-1.60) (-3.98) 
no. ofobs. ^ ^ ^ 
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Table 8 correlation among regional governance variables 
gov_mkt_rel non_sta_econ gds_mkt_ext fct_mkt_ext mkt_agt_lgl 
gov_mkt_rel 1.0000 
non_sta_econ 0.7649 1.0000 
gds_mkt_ext 0.5285 0.6521 1.0000 
fct_mkt_ext 0.6870 0.8339 0.3607 1.0000 
mkt_agt_lgl 0.4860 0.6195 0.1226 0.7813 1.0000 
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Table 9 regional governance and stock return synchronicity 
W e use gov_mkt_rel alone as the independent variable in this table. 
A general form of the O L S regression model is R I = a + / T X.^ + 
In terms of fixed effects regression, w e set up a general form R^ z= a. + y^ + X + 6•“ 
A general form of the random effects regression model is R^-^ = 0 + U. + y^ + T]. + 
Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial D u m m i e s and Province D u m m i e s are included but not reported. 
2. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % *** Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
, , -0.0050865* 0.0021003 -0.0048634 
gGV-mkt—rel (.1.87) (0.25) (-1.62) 
, - 0 . 0 3 7 7 0 5 3 * * -0.0362979* 
b & h (-2.43) “ (-1.93) 
, 0.0045901 0.018359 0.0025462 
gvnt-ctrl (0.71) (0.65) (0.34) 
, , -0.0006349** -0.0014749** -0.0005702** 
largest-stake (.2.47) (-2.16) (-2.18) 
-0.0073032*** -0.0096121*** -0.007138*** 
lnsq2-10 (-5.05) (-2.89) (-4.34) 
-5.40e-13** -2.88e-ll*** -4.92e-13 
tot—asst (-2.00) (-5.28) (-1.35) 
0.0038405 0.0071719 0.0039786 
leverage (0.95) (1.46) (0.99) 
-0.0510224*** -0.0260148*** -0.0451732*** 
tq (-4.66) (-4.82) (-11.11) 
, 」 -0.0261021*** -0.2718489** -0.0282064** 
Ig-PcgdP (-2.76) (-2.21) (-2.51) 
m , -0.007842 -0.2657032 -0.055133 
tdiZg 卯 ( . 0 . 0 5 ) ( - 0 . 6 6 ) ( - 0 . 2 8 ) 
」，」 0.019424 -0.0151718 0.0219625 
trade/gdp (1.63) (-0.23) (1.59) 
.」，」 0.0152449 0.1598217 0.0178335 
ind/gdp (0.87) (1.45) (0.87) 
Obs ^ ^ 
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Table 9 regional governance and stock return synchronicity (continued) 
W e use non_sta_econ alone as the independent variable in this table. 
A general form of the O L S regression model is Rl=a + (3' X“ + 6•“ 
In terms of fixed effects regression, w e set up a general form R ^ = a , + ,, + 广 X,, + 
A general form of the random effects regression model is R^^ =没 + W,. + 厂,+ ，X“ + Tj. + 
Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial D u m m i e s and Province D u m m i e s are included but not reported, 
2. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % ***Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
^ -0.0017491 0.0022313 -0.0015617 
non_sta_econ (-0.96) (0.35) (-0.76) 
-0.0379044** -0.0365419* 
(-2.45) - (-1.94) 
^ d 0.0045939 0.0185058 0.0025068 
gvnt-ctrl (0.71) (0.66) (0.34) 
. , -0.0006424** -0.001485** -0.0005751** 
largest—stake (-2.50) (-2.17) (-2.20) 
-0.0072892*** -0.00957*** -0.0071274*** 
(-5.04) (-2.87) (-4.33) 
-5.51e-13** -2.89e-ll*** -5.01e-13 
tot—asst (-2.04) (-5.28) (-1.37) 
, 0.0041137 0.0071456 0.0042093 
leverage (1.02) (1.46) (1.04) 
-0.0511396*** -0.0260788*** -0.0452305*** 
tq (-4.65) (-4.83) (-11.12) 
, 」 -0.0261211*** -0.2749062** -0.0282664** 
Ig-PCgdp (-2.77) (-2.23) (-2.51) 
m , -0.0192638 -0.2482365 -0.0679336 
他/gdp (-0.11) (-0.61) (-0.33) 
」，^ 0.0189584 -0.0138103 0.0214061 
trade/gdp (1.58) (-0.22) (1.53) 
•力 J 0.0145978 0.1552145 0.0170087 
ind/gdp (0.8) (1.45) (0.80) 
Obs ^ 4122 
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Table 9 regional governance and stock return synchronicity (continued) 
W e use gds_mkt_ext alone as the independent variable in this table. 
A general form of the O L S regression model is R ^ = CC + X.^ + £“ 
In terms of fixed effects regression, w e set up a general form Rf^ = 0(. + y^ + X “ + S “ 
A general form of the random effects regression model is R ^ 二没 + + 厂,+ X.^ + Tj • + 
Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial D u m m i e s and Province D u m m i e s are included but not reported. 
2. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. “ Idem., the 5 % *** Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
0.0005048 0.0072526 0.0009373 
gcls_mkt_ext (0.20) (0.97) (0.32) 
«_。L -0.0392022** -0.038051** 
b & h (-2.53) “ (-2.02) 
, 0.0042355 0.0190867 0.0021205 
gvnt-ctrl (0.66) (0.68) (0.28) 
. ^ , -0.0006354** -0.0014932** -0.0005661** largest-stake (.2.47) (-2.18) (-2.16) 
1 ^ -0.0072918*** -0.009574*** -0.0071189*** 
lnsq2 -10 (-5.04) (-2.88) (-4.33) 
-5.48e-13** -2.88e-ll*** -4.97e-13 
tot—asst (-2.03) (-5.29) (-1.36) 
, 0.0041831 0.0071031 0.0042464 
leverage (1.05) (1.45) (1.05) 
-0.051229*** -0.0261587*** -0 0452869*** 
tq (-4.65) (-4.85) (-11.14) 
, 」 -0.0263287*** -0.2890585** -0.0281111** 
Ig-PcgdP (-2.71) (-2.33) (-2 45) 
-0.1024348 -0.2754732 -0.1460136 
fdi/gdP (-0.58) (-0.70) (-0.70) 
, 0 . 0 2 2 0 3 7 1 * -0.021607 0.0245469* 
trade/gdp (1.75) (-0.34) (1.65) 
. . 0.0080038 0.1612768 0.010136 
ind/gdP (0.44) (1.51) (0.48) 
Obs 4122 4122 4122 
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Table 9 regional governance and stock return synchronicity (continued) 
W e use fct_mkt_ext alone as the independent variable in this table. 
A general form of the O L S regression model is RI = a + (5、X“ + 
In terms of fixed effects regression, we set up a general form Rf! = a. + + X + e “ 
A general form of the random effects regression model is Rj^ j =没 + + 厂,+ X-^ + Vjj + £“ 
Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial Dummies and Province Dummies are included but not reported. 
2. * Significance at the 10% level. " Idem., the 5% ***Idem., the 1% 
Estimation ^ re ^ 
-0.0058238** -0.0162862*** -0.0064742** 
tct_mkt_ext (-2.05) (-2.81) (-2.11) 
-0.0376326** -0.035948* 
b&h (-2.44) - (-1.91) 
, 0.004664 0.0186963 0.0026495 
gvnt-ctrl (0.72) (0.66) (0.35) 
, , -0.0006502** -0.0014573** -0.0005878** 
largest 一 stake (.2.54) (-2.13) (-2.25) 
-0.0072768*** -0.0097566*** -0.0071218*** 
⑴ (-5.03) (-2.94) (-4.33) 
-5.57e-13** -2.86e-ll*** -5.09e-13 
tot—asst (-2.05) (-5.25) (-1.39) 
. 0.0042459 0.0070248 0.0043447 leverage (1.06) (1.44) (1.08) 
-0.051085*** -0.0258775*** -0.0451434*** 
tq (-4.66) (-4.80) (-11.11) 
」 -0.0220757** -0.2607683** -0.0238845** 
Ig-PCgdP (-2.28) (-2.14) (-2.08) 
」 0.0913008 -0.4025971 0.0501621 
他/gdp (0.51) (-1.01) (0.24) 
」 0.024921** 0.0454581 0.0286812** 
trade/gdp (2.07) (0.70) (2.03) 
」 0.0158293 0.169401 0.0200405 
ind/gdp (0.90) (1.59) (0.97) 
Obs ^ ^ A m 
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Table 9 regional governance and stock return synchronicity (continued) 
W e use mkt_agt_lgl alone as the independent variable in this table. 
A general form of the O L S regression model is R I - a X . ^ + 
In terms of fixed effects regression, w e set up a general form R ^ = a , + ,, + 广 + 
A general form of the random effects regression model is R^-^ = 0 + U. X“ + Vj. + £“ 
Note: 1. The Year Dummies, Industrial D u m m i e s and Province D u m m i e s are included but not reported. 
2. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % *** Idem., the 1 % 
Estimation O L S F E R E 
, ,1 0.0016979 -0.0006488 0.0009592 
mkt-agt�gl (0.50) (-0.15) (0.27) 
k p “ -0.0389824** -0.0375548** 
b & h (-2.53) - (-2.00) 
, 0.0042829 0.018527 0.0022294 
gvnt-ctrl (0.67) (0.66) (0.30) 
, 1 -0.0006356** -0.001477** -0.0005682** 
largest-stake (.2.47) (-2.16) (-2.17) 
- 0 . 0 0 7 2 8 7 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 9 6 2 6 8 * * * - 0 . 0 0 7 1 2 4 3 * * * 
(-5.04) (-2.89) (-4.33) 
-5.54e-13** -2.87e-ll*** -5.02e-13 
tot-asst (-2.05) (-5.25) (-1.37) 
1 0.0041684 0.007076 0.004238 
leverage (i.04) (1.45) (1.05) 
- 0 . 0 5 1 2 1 4 3 * * * - 0 . 0 2 5 9 7 2 6 * * * - 0 . 0 4 5 3 1 1 4 * * * 
t q ( - 4 . 6 5 ) ( - 4 . 8 1 ) ( - 1 1 . 1 5 ) 
1 � - 0 . 0 2 8 7 9 1 1 * * * -0.2644668** -0.029991** 
Ig-PCgdP (-2.79) (-2.11) (-2.49) 
」 -0.0807671 -0.3007417 -0.1132516 
他/gdp (-0.50) (-0.72) (-0.59) 
」 ,」 0.0163603 -0.0079237 0.0200341 
trade/gdp (i.08) (-0.12) (1.17) 
」，」 0.0101696 0.1540085 0.0125967 
ind/gdp (0.58) (1.44) (0.62) 
〇bs 4122 4122 4122 
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Part II. Foreign Merger and Acquisition 
in Corporate China 
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Abstract 
In this thesis, we investigate foreign mergers and acquisitions targeting Chinese listed 
companies. Using four measures of corporate operating performance, the study of our 
sample from 1999 to 2004 indicates that the post-acquisition operating performance of 
foreign acquired companies suffers deterioration. Using control-group matching 
method, we find some similar target companies, however, acquired by domestic 
investors or even not being acquired at all, and name them domestic M&A group and 
non-M&A group respectively. Whoever the acquirer is, we find that all the target 
companies share the similar growth pattern: the operating performance displays a 
W-shaped pattern during the 7 years we investigated, and a V-shaped pattern after the 
acquisition transaction year. To explain this phenomenon, we further investigate the 
probability and the frequency of post-acquisition restructuring activities in each group. 
Using unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we notice that the frequency of 
restructuring activities taken by foreign acquired companies is analogous to that taken 
by other companies in domestic M&A group and non-M&A group, which supports 
our arguments. Besides, all of our empirical findings are consistent with our 
theoretical hypotheses. 
Submitted by Hao He 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Merger and acquisition activities have increased dramatically in China over the last 
several years. While such transactions were virtually unknown merely ten years ago, 
they are now an increasingly common and important feature of China's economic 
landscape. M&A now offers foreign investors a viable method of entering the China 
market. 
China's economic reforms and robust growth have fuelled the increased pace of M&A 
activity. China's accession to the World Trade Organization has opened previously 
closed industry sectors to foreign investors, and is gradually lifting operating 
restrictions previously imposed on foreign investors, granting them greater access to 
China's domestic market. With the continued strong growth of the Chinese economy, 
M&A transactions offering immediate market access are becoming an increasingly 
attractive alternative to greenfield investments. 
We raise several questions of whether foreign investors in China's market increases 
the target companies' profits; due to better technology, managerial skills, or other 
valuable attributes as compared to the domestic acquirers, whether foreign investors 
in China market makes the target companies outperform the companies acquired by 
pure domestic investors or even the companies not being acquired. 
To answer these questions, we firstly investigate these issues systematically for the 
post-acquisition operating performance of listed companies being acquired by foreign 
investors in China. We use unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test to determine 
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whether the sample companies' post-acquisition operating performance becomes 
better or not. And we find very strong empirical support for our main hypothesis that 
the operating performance is not showing a better and better growth trend. We then 
adopt the control group matching method to find similar target companies acquired by 
domestic investors or even not being acquired at all. Afterwards, we compare the 
operating performance measures of the foreign acquired companies with those of the 
similar target companies, to see whether foreign acquired ones outperform domestic 
acquired ones or ones not being acquired. We find strong empirical evidence that they 
all share the similar W-shaped growth pattern, and the foreign acquired companies 
neither outperform nor underperform the control group companies. 
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature on both 
the cross-border and domestic merger and acquisition. Section 3 describes our 
conceptual starting point and the hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the variables used in 
our empirical study, and presents the data set and the methodology. Section 5 presents 
the econometric analysis and the empirical results. Section 6 concludes with a 
summary of the results. 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
2.1 Related Literature Review 
A growing literature studies the effect of foreign direct investment on listed 
companies in emerging markets. Several competing theories on acquisition motives 
have been established and tested empirically (Jensen, 1988). Some studies report 
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improvements (Healy et al.，1992; and Ramaswamy and Salatka, 1996), some report 
deterioration (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1997; and Magenhiem and Mueller, 1998), 
and others do not find significant changes at all (Bradley and Jarrel, 1988; and 
Herman and Lowenstein, 1988). 
The event study methodology has been extensively used to analyze the effect of 
mergers and acquisitions on the valuation of the target firm in the finance literature. 
Some studies found that target shareholders are benefited while the acquirers just 
break even or even make losses (Jensen and Ruback, 1982; Jensen, 1988). Other 
studies focus on acquiring firms. Fate mi (1984) finds small positive cumulative 
abnormal return of the acquiring firm around the date of expansion. Doukas and 
Travlos (1988) find a differential impact on the acquiring firm depending on the 
acquirer's prior experience with foreign expansion. Morck and Yeung (1992) find that 
acquiring firms with information based assets experience a significantly positive stock 
price reaction. These studies however do not examine the effect on the target firm of a 
foreign acquisition. To this extent, they cannot examine the benefits to economies due 
to foreign acquisitions, the crucial question for emerging economies. 
There have been a number of papers that have not employed event study methodology 
to address the question of the value of foreign ownership. The evidence on spillovers 
to the acquired firms is mixed. Early studies surveyed in Caves (1996) suggest that 
foreign-owned firms in relatively advanced developing countries enjoy little 
productivity advantage over domestic firms. More recent literature suggests that 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) does bring relatively efficient technologies to 
developing countries, but that diffusion to domestic firms is uncertain (Tybout, 1999). 
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In a cross-sectional study of 164 large Indian manufacturing companies, Sinha (1993) 
finds that foreign equity participation is associated with higher productivity. Haddad 
and Harrison (1993), using a panel of 3,933 Moroccan manufacturing firms, find that 
although foreign-owned firms had higher productivity levels, they did not have faster 
rates of productivity growth. ^ Aitken and Harrison (1999) use a panel of over 4,000 
Venezuelan firms to find that individual plants benefit from foreign investors, at least 
when those plants are small, but that there is a negative spillover since the 
productivity of domestically owned plants decreases. Most of these studies have been 
country specific. 
There has been little literature on foreign merger and acquisition targeting listed 
companies in China. Literature commenced to grow in the past few years, with mixed 
findings. From the sample of listed Chinese companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
lying between 1993 and 1995, Yu and Yang (2000) report that there are significant 
accumulated abnormal return on stocks of target firms, however, insignificant ones on 
stocks of the acquirers. In contrast, based on the event study method, Li and Chen 
(2002) focus on the empirical study of 349 M&A that occurred between 1999 and 
2000 in China A-share market, and they find significant abnormal return on the 
acquirers, but insignificant abnormal return on acquired firms. In addition, Yang (2000) 
reports significant abnormal returns before announcement and suggests information 
leakage. 
2.2 Recent History of Foreign M&A in China 
5 The point estimated suggested slower growth, but was insignificant. 
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Before the year 1985, China did not allow any foreign investors to participate in any 
M&A activities. Share purchases commenced in the first half of 1990s as an option for 
foreigners who were seeking to acquire a Chinese company. Foreign investors had 
been permitted to acquire B shares in the listed companies. In the years that followed, 
however, a way had emerged for private equity deals, in which foreigners can 
purchase shares through a private placement in an unlisted company, and for strategic 
investment by share acquisitions in the listed companies. 
Since the second half of the 1990s, the Chinese authorities have started to officially 
encourage the use of joint stock limited companies to hold state-owned assets. Many 
non-share issuing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were likely to be converted into 
joint stock limited companies, providing foreign investors with opportunities to buy 
directly the shares of an increasing concern. 
The last few years have witnessed the emergence of a secondary market for 
investments in existing foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) established by early 
investors in China. Some take the form of purchasing an interest by one foreign party 
from another, or by the foreign party from the original Chinese party, or a sale from a 
foreign party back to either the Chinese party or a third party. Increasingly, the 
purchase and sale of such interests take place through transactions involving the 
transfer of shares held by a Hong Kong or other "offshore" holding company. 
However, in all these cases, the percentages of the assets or shares for which the 
foreign business can hold are still restricted by the authorities. ^ 
6 "Listed C o m p a n y " , Shanghai Stock Exchange, 1998 and 1999; "China M&ANet”， 
http://comm.mergers-china.com 
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Like acquisitions, mergers among domestic Chinese companies had become 
commonplace since 1990s. Such mergers attempted both to rescue failing SOEs by 
combining them with healthy enterprises, and to create conglomerates. Although 
mergers directly between foreign companies and Chinese entities are not yet possible 
to all the SOEs in China, as foreign investors seek to restructure their existing Chinese 
holdings, there have been increasing numbers of mergers between FIEs during last 
several years. 
Chapter 3. Theory and Hypotheses 
3.1 Theoretical Argument 
Although China's regulatory regime is changing to further stimulate foreign investors, 
the Chinese government will continue to have compelling political and economic 
reasons for maintaining controls in many economic sectors. And China's business and 
legal environments will continue to pose obstacles to M&A transactions, especially 
for the acquisition of listed companies. 
China's regulatory framework for cross-border M&A remains a complex and 
incomplete patchwork of laws, regulations and policy decisions made by various 
ministries and government agencies. For example, an acquisition of a Chinese listed 
company will likely require approvals from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council 
(SASAC) as well as the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). Further 
approvals may be required depending on the structure of the transaction and industry 
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of the target. Besides, a lack of transparency, coupled with low standards of corporate 
transparency and disclosure, makes it difficult for potential foreign investors to carry 
out due diligence to accepted international standards. Valuing the potential liabilities 
of a firm is especially difficult. 
On the one hand, the complicated regulatory framework for foreign M&A makes 
some foreign businesses reluctant to conduct merger and acquisition in China. They 
stated frankly that, although they know well that the rate of returns on investment in 
China is much higher than that in Europe and other regions, they are still feeling 
dithery, for they are worried about uncertainties caused by the M&A in a country 
claiming socialist economy. And they assume that these uncertainties will be more 
likely to constitute obstacles to good integration and healthy operation of the M&A 
companies.7 In fact, other than complicated economic problems related to the M&A, 
how to manage the M&A companies in China is also a new challenge for many 
foreign investors. Even in the developed countries, despite the enormous volume of 
merger and acquisitions, studies also suggest that more than 50% of all mergers and 
Q • 
acquisitions fail to create value for acquirers. Furthermore, it was pointed out that 
the failure was mostly attributed to difficulties in the M&A integrations phase. 
On the other hand, foreign investors are highly restricted by the regulatory authorities 
to becoming the controlling shareholder of the Chinese listed companies. The Interim 
Provisions on the Administration of Security and Investment in China by Quanlified 
Foreign Institutional Investors establishes a framework for permitting limited foreign 
investment in the A share market. Foreign institutional investors that satisfiy certain 
7 "Be Aware of Doing Business in China", Journal of Foreign investors, 1999 
8 "Deliverable synergy: Wining in the Global M & A Market", Amity Forrest, Partner, C E O , 2001 
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stringent criteria are classified as Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) and 
are permitted to make limited A share investments. A QFII is not permitted to hold 
more than 10% of the outstanding shares of any particular listed company, and the 
combined holdings of QFIIs in a company cannot exceed 20% of its listed A shares. 
Hence, foreign investors in listed companies have traditionally taken the form of 
negotiated minority stakes, and have been for the purpose of establishing a strategic 
relationship or making a financial investment rather than for obtaining operating 
control. Hence, they have rather limited power to affect the decisions of the 
companies and will not readily transfer better technology, managerial skills, or other 
valuable attributes to the Chinese listed companies. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
In theory, the M&A activities largely finance the target companies and eliminate the 
dead weight loss caused by China's misallocation of financing resources. Especially 
for foreign M&A，by intuition, people sense that foreign investors would bring better 
technology and managerial skills, so as to bring about great efficiency gains. However, 
we find mixed evidence on the value to a developing country firm of being acquired 
by a developed country firm (Caves, 1996; Tybout, 1999; Sinha, 1993; Haddad and 
Harrison, 1993; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Many researchers prove that foreign 
M&A targeting developing country firms may not definitely add to their value, instead, 
could harm them. In our thesis, from the analysis in section 3.1, it is apparent that the 
foreign investors are severely restricted in conducting restructuring activities after 
acquisition in China, and they confront the integration issues as well, so that the target 
firm's operating performance would not change significantly. 
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The line of reasoning leads us to the following main hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: 
The foreign merger and acquisition would not have significant positive effects on the 
target finil s operating performance in China. 
Hypothesis 2: 
The operating performance of the targets acquired by foreign investors will not 
outperform those acquired by domestic acquirers. 
Hypothesis 3: 
The operating performance of the targets acquired by foreign investors will not 
outperform those not being acquired. 
Chapter 4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Sample 
Our data are mainly from China Stock Market & Accounting Research Dataset 
(CSMAR), compiled by useful information from China Listed Company Yearbook. 
The CSMAR dataset contains dates and details of both cross-border and domestic 
mergers and acquisitions. However, one of the deficiencies of this dataset is that it 
only contains all acquisition transactions targeting Chinese listed companies from 
1999 to 2002. Thanks to China Merger and Acquisition report (2003, 2004, and 2005), 
we expand the sample's time period till 2004. Another deficiency is that the database 
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only reports the years in which acquisition contracts were negotiated and drafted. 
However, the actual transaction year might be one or several years later, because the 
execution of acquisition needs a substantial period for the approval from the 
authorities. To solve this problem, we check the information reporting changes of 
shareholders for every acquired sample listed company, and thus specify the exact 
year in which actual transactions take place. In the process, we correct some 
misreports in the original CSMAR database. Eventually, the sample includes all 
foreign and domestic merger and acquisition targeting Chinese listed companies 
between 1999 and 2004. 
Furthermore, we decompose the whole sample into two sub-sample datasets: foreign 
M&A dataset, domestic M&A dataset according to identities of the acquirers.^ 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for foreign M&A transactions, and it shows that 
only two foreign investors occupied the controlling shareholder position after M&A in 
China. 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
4.2 Control Group Matching 
There are several major inherent disadvantages in using stock returns as the 
benchmark for examining the effects of merger and acquisition in China. The 
emerging Chinese stock market, as many studies show, has more unreasonable 
9 Foreign M & A group means the sample group that the acquirers are foreign invested companies; domestic M & A 
group means the sample group that the acquirers are domestic invested companies. 
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momentums than developed stock markets, thus make the measure of expected 
corporate performance hardly accurate. Furthermore, since the emerging Chinese 
stock market is barely efficient, the result of the studies with event study method is 
less reliable. Hence, we adopt the operating performance method in our study. 
To evaluate the post-acquisition operating performance, it is necessary to control the 
effects from other potentially important factors. We follow the performance-based 
control group matching method described by Barber and Lyon (1996) and recently 
adopted by Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004). Barber and Lyon focus on 
performance similarity and industry similarity simultaneously in their matching 
process. 
In our thesis, we extend their method by considering more dimensions. We argue that 
different years would have different year-effects, so that we add year correspondence 
as a dimension in our process of constructing control groups. Besides, we think that 
having not considered the firm size in the method of Barber and Lyon is definitely a 
deficiency, because firm size is one of the most important characteristics describing a 
company. Furthermore, we bring industry into the criteria because different industry 
has different norms, e.g. although the firm size may be similar, the comparison of 
different firms belonging to different industries with different industry norms will be 
meaningless. At the end, we take ownership structure into consideration. Eventually, 
we use year correspondence, firm size, operating performance, industry, and 
ownership structure as the criteria in constructing our control groups for the foreign 
M&A group, the treatment group.� Because our sample size of the treatment group is 
⑴ The categories of industry in our thesis are from Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
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comparatively small, to expand our sample sizes of the control groups so that try to 
avoid the bias as much as possible, we do not adopt one-to-one matching method. 
We construct control group from the Chinese listed companies, using Book Value 
Total Assets as the measure of firm size and EBIT/Assets as the measure of operating 
performance. As our control group matching method is more complicated than Barber 
and Lyon, our selection process is more rigorous as follows. 
We will introduce the domestic control group matching process in this paragraph. For 
companies in the domestic M&A sample, firstly, we choose those whose acquisition 
transaction happened in the same year as the sample companies in the treatment group 
did. Secondly, we further choose those that are in the same industry and the acquirer 
has the same shareholding ranks in the ownership structures as the sample companies 
do in the treatment group after the M&A transaction. Thirdly, we exclude those not 
satisfying the following rule: both the firm size measure and the operating 
performance measure are within ±25%，namely [75%, 125%], of those of the sample 
companies in the year before the sample's acquisition transaction. Because there are 
five rigorous criteria, we expand our filter-band from ±25% to ±30% even ±35%, and 
repeat the process should there be no such companies. If we still cannot find a perfect 
match using even ±35% band, we choose a company whose total assets and operating 
performance are closest to those of the sample company. However, most control 
companies could be matched to sample companies using ±30% band width. The last 
step is to double-check the control group list to ensure that there are not repeated 
items. Eventually, because we do not adopt the one-to-one matching for our research, 
we choose all the companies in domestic M&A sample that fulfill all the five criteria. 
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For the non-M&A control group, we will derive it step by step from all the Chinese 
listed companies that have not experienced M&A in years. Firstly, we exclude the 
companies both in treatment group and the domestic M&A control group. Secondly, 
we choose those in the same industry as the sample companies in the treatment group. 
Thirdly, we further exclude those not satisfying the following rule: both the firm size 
measure and the operating performance measure are within ±25% of those companies 
in the treatment group in the year before the sample's acquisition transaction. Because 
there are four rigorous criteria, we expand our filter-band from ±25% to ±30% even 
±35%, and repeat the process should there be no such companies. If we still cannot 
find a perfect match using even ±35% band, we choose a company whose total assets 
and operating performance are closest to those of the sample company. However, 
most control companies could be matched to sample companies using ±30% band 
width. The last step is to double-check the control group list to ensure that there are 
not repeated items. Eventually, because we do not adopt the one-to-one matching for 
our research, we choose all the companies in the non-M&A sample that fulfill all the 
four criteria. 
4.3 Methodology for Comparison between Treatment Group and Control Groups 
As we stated earlier, we intend to compare the post-acquisition operating performance 
between the treatment group and the control groups to see if the foreign acquirers 
could improve the operating performance of the target firms more significantly than 
the pure domestic ones could. 
71 
To measure the operating performance of the target firms, we decide to employ four 
feasible tools, including operating income, EBIT (earnings before interest and tax), 
gross profit and net profit. Furthermore, to eliminate the effects of different firm sizes, 
we use operating income/total assets, EBIT/total assets, gross profit/total assets, and 
net profit/total assets as the final measures. We adopt the commonly-used time period, 
7 years, in our thesis, which includes 3 years before the acquisition transaction as the 
pre-acquisition period, the particular year when acquisition transaction happened, and 
3 years afterwards as the post-acquisition period. And we define the time period as t= 
(-3，-2, -1, 0, 1,2，3). For instance, one year before acquisition is denoted as -1, the 
year of acquisition is denoted as 0，and one year after acquisition is denoted as 1. 
We adopt two methods of the operating performance comparison for the treatment 
group and the control groups. Because we do not employ the one-to-one control-group 
matching method, we use both unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test instead 
of using paired t-test. The first method is to compare the operating performance 
within each group in year t with the one in the next year, which is the way to 
determine the operation situation in each group separately. Besides, to determine 
whether the post-acquisition operating performance is better or not in each group, we 
also compare the operating performance within each group in year 0, 1, 2 and 3 with 
-1. To make the comparison more accurate and clearer, we take the second method. 
Our strategy is to subtract the operating performance ratios in year t from those in the 
coming year within each group, and then compare them between the treatment group 
and the domestic M&A control group, and between the treatment group and the 
non-M&A control group. 
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Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 report the summary statistics for the foreign M&A 
performance, domestic M&A performance and non-M&A performance respectively. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
To make the operating performance trend clearer, we also plot the operating 
performance dynamics using the mean of the four measures in the 7-year windows for 
both the treatment group and the control groups in Figure 1 to Figure 4. Intuitively, we 
notice that both the treatment groups and the control groups share the similar growth 
pattern: the operating performance display a W-shaped pattern during the 7 years we 
investigated, and a V-shaped pattern after the acquisition transaction year. 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
4.4 Restructuring Activities 
We find that after the acquisition transactions are finished, the new shareholders 
usually undertake various types of restructuring activities. We argue that the 
post-acquisition operating performance of the target companies is influenced by the 
restructuring activities. And our strategy is to compare the probability and the 
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frequency of each type of restructuring activities between the treatment group and the 
control groups. Because we do not employ the one-to-one control-group matching 
method, we use both unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test instead of using 
paired t-test. 
The CSMAR Dataset reports altogether 6 types of restructuring activities, namely, 
acquisition of other firms, purchase of assets, divestitures, equity transfers, exchange 
of assets, and debt restructuring. According to the classification used by CSMAR, we 
select the post-acquisition restructuring activities for our treatment group and the 
control groups. Since the time length of the CSMAR Dataset is only from 1999 to 
2002, we extend the restructuring activities from 1999 to 2006 by searching the 
yearbook of each company in treatment group and control groups. 
Towards this end, we generate dummy variables for each type of restructuring 
activities in each year. Using 6 letters for 6 types of activities, we denote acquisition 
of other firms as A, purchase of assets as B, divestitures as C, equity transfers as D, 
exchange of assets as E, and debt restructuring as F. For the time, we define one year 
before acquisition as -1, the year of acquisition as 0, and one year after acquisition as 
1，and so on. Furthermore, we define Xt as the frequencies of type X restructuring 
activities that occurred in year t (X={A，B, C, D, E, F}，and t={0, 1，2, 3}), and Xt 
takes value 1 if X activity occurred in year t, 0 otherwise. For instance, CI stands for 
equity transfers in the year after the acquisition transaction, and it equals 1 should the 
equity transfers happen in the year after the acquisition transaction. 
Chapter 5. Empirical Result 
74 
5.1 Comparison of Operating Performance between Treatment Group and 
Control Group 
Using the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we commence to compare the 
operating performance measures between the treatment group and the control groups, 
to see whether the operating performance improves or deteriorates during the 7 years 
we investigated. The first one to be discussed is the operating income/total assets in 
Table 5. Within each group, we take the year-on-year comparison of the operating 
income/total assets ratio. Because we do not employ the one-to-one control-group 
matching method, we use both unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test instead 
of using paired t-test. We find that the ratio increases significantly before the 
acquisition year for both the treatment group and the control groups. Specifically, for 
the treatment group, we find that the operating income/total assets ratio statistically 
significantly improves in 3 time intervals, -2 to -1, -1 to 0, and 2 to 3. The z-statistics 
of interval -2 to -1 and 2 to 3 are -2.025 and -2.023 respectively, and both statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The z-statistic of interval -1 to 0 is -1.807 and significant 
at the 10% level. For the domestic M&A control group, there is only one time interval, 
-1 to 0，during which the operating income/total assets statistically significant 
improves. The z-statistics is -2.914 and significant at the 1% level. For the non-M&A 
control group, -1 to 0 and 2 to 3 are the time intervals during which the operating 
income/total assets improves significantly. And the z-statistics is -3.633 and -1.836, 
and significant at the 1% and the 10%level respectively. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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The second operating performance measure to be discussed in our thesis is EBIT/total 
assets in Table 6. Also, within each group, we compare the EBIT/total assets ratio in 
year t with the one in the coming year as well, with unpaired t-test and Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. We find that both for the treatment group and the non-M&A control 
group, except for the significant deterioration in 3 years before the acquisition year, 
there are not other significant differences. However, for the domestic M&A control 
group, there is a significant improvement of the EBIT/total assets ratio in one year 
before the acquisition year. Specifically, for the treatment group, the z-statistic of 
interval -3 to -2 is 2.059 and significant at the 5% level. For the domestic M&A 
control group, the z-statistic of interval -1 to 0 is -2.378 and significant at the 5% level 
as well. For the non-M&A control group, the z-statistic of interval -3 to -2 is 1.908 
and significant at the 10% level. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The third operating performance measure to be discussed is the gross profit/total 
assets in Table 7. Within each group, we compare the gross profit/total assets in year t 
with the one in the coming year. We find that the gross profit/total assets ratio suffers 
significant deterioration in 3 years before the acquisition in the treatment group, 
improves in the year before acquisition in the domestic M&A group, and decreases in 
3 year before the acquisition in the non-M&A group. Specifically, for the treatment 
group, the z-statistics of interval -3 to -2 is 2.201 and significant at the 5% level. The 
t-statistic and z-statistic of interval -1 to 3 are 2.6663 and 1.753 respectively. For the 
domestic M&A group, the z-statistics of interval -1 to 0 is -1.804 and significant at the 
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10% level. For the non-M&A group, the z-statistics of interval -3 to -2 is 2.813 and 
significant at the 1% level. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The last operating performance measure to be discussed is the net profit/total assets in 
Table 8. Within each group, we compare the net profit/total assets in year t with the 
one in the coming year. We find that the ratio in treatment group deteriorates badly in 
3 years before the acquisition transaction. Further, when we compare the ratios in the 
2 and 3 years after acquisition transaction with the one before acquisition, we find that 
they also confront a significant declining trend. The circumstance in domestic M&A 
group is a little bit more complicated. Firstly, it declines in 3 years before acquisition, 
and then gets better in one year before acquisition, and eventually, deteriorates again 
in 2 years after acquisition. For the non-M&A group, except for the decline in the 3 
years before acquisition transaction, there is no significant improvement or 
deterioration. Specifically, for the treatment group, the z-statistics of intervals -3 to -2, 
-1 to 2 and -1 to 3 are 2.438, 1.782 and 1.753 respectively, and all of them are 
statistically significant. For the domestic M&A group, the z-statistics of intervals -3 to 
-2, -1 to 0 and 1 to 2 are 2.615, -1.691 and 2.181 respectively, and all of them are 
statistically significant. For the non-M&A group, the z-statistics of interval -3 to -2 is 
2.451 and significant at the 5 % level. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
In summary, we find that the post-acquisition operating performance of foreign 
acquired companies commences to significantly deteriorate from the second year after 
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the acquisition transaction, compared with those in one year before acquisition. This 
result is consistent with our hypothesis 1. Besides, both for the treatment group and 
the control groups, we also find that companies in our sample experience mostly the 
similar pattern that has barely appeared in other M&A literature: the operating 
performance display a W-shaped pattern during the 7 years we investigated, and a 
V-shaped pattern after the acquisition transaction year. 
Since the results using the first method display the similar operating performance 
pattern in all three groups, it is not clear whether the treatment group acquired by the 
foreign investors outperform the control groups. Hence, we commence to adopt the 
second method trying to make the results more accurate and clearer. 
For the operating income/total assets ratio, there is not significant improvement or 
deterioration between the treatment group and the domestic M&A control group 
during the consecutive 7 years. Although the t-statistic of interval 2 to 3 is 2.3329, the 
z-statistic is 1.214, which is not even significant at the 10% level. Also, there are no 
significant operating performance differences between the treatment group and the 
non-M&A control group in the completed 7-year sample. 
For the EBIT/total assets ratio, we find that it increases significantly in interval -2 to 
-1 in the comparison of the treatment group and the domestic M&A group. Although 
the t-statistic is 1.6227, which is very close to the 10% significance level, the 
z-statistic is 1.913 and significant at the 10% level. In the comparison for treatment 
group and the non-M&A group, the z-statistic of interval -3 to -2 is 1.664 and 
significant at the 10% level. Besides, we notice that the z-statistic of interval -2 to -1 
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is 1.586, which is also close to the 10% significance level. However, we find no 
significant differences for this ratio in the post-acquisition comparison between 
treatment group and the control groups in Table 10. 
For the gross profit/total assets ratio, the comparison for the treatment group and the 
domestic M&A group shows that it increases remarkably in interval -2 to -1. So does 
the result of the comparison for treatment group and the non-M&A group. For the 
former comparison, both the t-statistic and the z-statistic are statistically significant at 
the 10% level, and are 1.7901 and 1.655 respectively. For the latter comparison, 
although the t-statistic is 0.863, the z-statistic is 2.343 and significant at the 5% level. 
These tell us that there is improving performance for the treatment group before the 
acquisition. However, we find insignificant differences for this ratio in the 
post-acquisition comparison between treatment group and the control groups in Table 
10. 
The net profit/total assets ratio soars in intervals -2 to -1 and 1 to 2 when we compare 
the treatment group with the domestic M&A control group. The t-statistic of interval 
-2 to -1 is 1.7463 and significant at the 10% level. And the z-statistic is 2.017 and 
significant at the 5% level. Although the t-statistic of 1 to 2 is 0.6595, the z-statistic is 
1.782 and significant at the 10% level. For the comparison of the treatment group and 
the non-M&A group, except for the distinct improvement in interval -2 to -1, there are 
no other significant differences. Specifically, the z-statistic is 2.012 and significant at 
the 5 % level. In Table 10，we compare this ratio of treatment group with the ones of 
control groups. We find that there are no significant differences between the treatment 
group and the domestic control group. And for the comparison between the treatment 
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group and the non-M&A control group, we find that the z-statistic of interval -1 to 2 is 
-2.201, and significant at the 5% level. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
From the four operating performance measures discussed above, we find that the 
companies in the treatment group share the similar growth pattern with both the 
domestic M&A control group and the non-M&A control group; besides, although the 
operating performance of foreign acquired companies significantly improves in 
interval -2 to -1, compared with the control groups, the post-acquisition operating 
performance neither outperforms nor underperforms the control groups. These 
findings are consistent with our hypothesis 2 and 3. 
5.2 Comparison of Restructuring Activities between Treatment Group and 
Control Group 
Trying to explain the operating performance pattern, we report the comparison for the 
post-acquisition restructuring activities between the treatment group and control 
groups in Table 10. In year 0, for the comparison of treatment group and the domestic 
M&A group, the z-statistic of AO is 0.447, the one of BO is 1.000, the one of CO is 
-1.000, the one of DO is 0.816 and the one of EO is 0.577; for the comparison for the 
treatment group and the non-M&A group, the z-statistic of AO is 0.816, the one of BO 
is -0.577, the one of DO is 1.342 and the one of EO is 0.577. These results show that 
companies in the treatment group take slightly more activities than those in the 
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control groups in year 0, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
From year 1 to year 3，we noticed that all of the z-statistics are non-positive expect 
for the one of Bl , which implies that less restructuring activities are taken by the 
companies in the treatment group. During the time from year 1 to year 3, we also find 
that several post-acquisition restructuring activities taken by treatment group are 
significantly less than those taken by the domestic M&A control group, including Dl, 
A2, A3, B3 and D3. Specifically, the t-statistic of Dl is -1.8729, and the z-statistic is 
-1.732. Both of them are statistically significant at the 10% level. The z-statistic of A2 
is -1.732 and significant at the 10% level. The z-statistics of A3, B3 and D3 are 
-2.236, -1.732 and -2.000 respectively. Also, the analogous results come out in the 
comparison for the treatment group and the non-M&A control group. The t-statistic of 
Dl is -2.2315 and significant at the 5% level, and the z-statistic is -1.732 and 
significant at the 10% level. The t-statistic of El is -1.7918 and significant at the 10% 
level, and the z-statistic is -2.000 and significant at the 5% level. However, since the 
restructuring activities will have time lagging effects on operating performance, those 
taken in year 3 will mostly take effect in the future, out of our consideration in this 
thesis. Hence, only the activities of Dl, El and A2 will be valuable when we compare 
the restructuring activities among the 3 groups in this thesis. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
From the results above, we find that the foreign acquired companies tend to take 
restructuring activities slightly intensively in the particular acquisition transaction 
year, however, comparatively quietly in the following years, compared with either the 
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domestic M&A control group or the non-M&A control group. Since only 3 out of 20 
post-acquisition restructuring activities are remarkably less taken by the foreign 
acquired companies, we believe that the treatment group shares the similar growth 
pattern with the companies in control groups is a reasonable result. 
Chapter 6. Conclusion 
This thesis investigates the post-acquisition operating performance of foreign acquired 
companies and compares its measures with those of domestic M&A control group and 
non-M&A control group respectively. Generally, we find that the post-acquisition 
operating performance of foreign acquired companies commences to significantly 
deteriorate from the second year after acquisition transaction when we compare it 
with those in one year before acquisition. Besides, both for the treatment group and 
the control groups, we also find that companies in our sample experience mostly the 
similar pattern that has barely appeared in other M&A literature: the operating 
performance displays a W-shaped pattern during the 7 years we investigated, and a 
V-shaped pattern after the acquisition transaction year. 
Afterwards, from comparing the four operating performance measures, we find that 
the companies in the treatment group indeed share the similar growth pattern with 
both the domestic M&A control group and the non-M&A control group; besides, 
although the operating performance of foreign acquired companies significantly 
improves in interval -2 to -1, compared with the control groups, the post-acquisition 
operating performance neither outperforms nor underperforms the control groups. 
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Furthermore, to illustrate the operating performance pattern, we compare the 
post-acquisition restructuring activities between the treatment group and control 
groups. We find that the foreign acquired companies tend to take restructuring 
activities intensively in the particular acquisition transaction year, however, much less 
in the following years, compared with either the domestic M&A control group or the 
non-M&A control group. Because only 3 out of 20 post-acquisition restructuring 
activities are significantly less taken by the foreign acquired companies, we believe 
consequently sharing the similar growth pattern with the companies in control groups 
is a reasonable result. 
These findings have implications for targeted listed companies both cross-border and 
domestic merger and acquisition targeting listed companies in China. Our study sheds 
light on the control-group matching method and the growth pattern of the companies 
being acquired; hence, this provides useful information to the Chinese regulatory 
authorities to design better policies or incentive mechanisms. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics for foreign M&A 
W e define the year in which the M & A transaction happened as the Year; the stock code of the target 
company as the Target company; the rank of the foreign investor after M & A transaction as the 
Rank; and the industry to which the target company belongs as the Sector. Where A-Agriculture; 
B-Mining; C-Manufacturing; D-Utilities; E-Construction; F-Transportation; G-Information Tech.; 
H-Retail; I-Finance; J-Real Estate; K-Social Services; L-Media; M-Conglomerates 
Year Target company Rank Sector 
1999 000681 1 CI 3 
000016 3 C85 
2000 000002 3 JOl 
000016 3 C85 
000018 3 Cll 
2002 600600 3 C05 
2003 000761 2 C65 
600019 2 C65 
600337 2 C25 
600894 2 C65 
2004 600607 1 M 
000869 2 C05 
600132 2 C05 
600135 2 C43 
600695 2 COl 
600362 3 C67 
000726 4 Cll 
600152 4 Cll 
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Table 3 Summary statistics for the domestic M&A performance 
W e define the actual M & A transaction year as time 0, the 广 year after the transaction as time 1, and the 
last year before the transaction as time -1. Opr_Inc/Tot_asst is the short form of Operating Income/Total 
Assets. EBIT/Tot_Asst is the short form of EBIT/Total Assets. Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of 
Gross Profit/ Total Assets. Net_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of Net Profit/Total Assets. And S.D. 
means standard deviation. 
Time Variable No. of Obs. Mean S. D. ^ Max 
-3 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 17 0.737452 0.344477 0.312688 1.47892 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 17 0.055198 0.049887 -0.07428 0.136539 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 17 0.05908 0.050156 -0.0602 0.145954 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 17 0.046878 0.046248 -0.07026 0.12089 
-2 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 18 0.710078 0.270543 0.348003 1. 193582 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 18 0.043258 0.057855 -0.1519 0.122344 
Grs—Prft/Tot_Asst 18 0.049752 0.05853 -0.14987 0.12658 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 18 0.036922 0.052889 -0.1489 0.105866 
-1 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 18 0.755279 0.257508 0.490401 1. 198429 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 18 0.052729 0.049181 -0.0894 0.127408 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 18 0.064082 0.031301 0.01755 0.123641 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 18 0.048957 0.023624 0.011511 0.098884 
0 Opr_Inc/Tot—Asst 18 0.88574 0.415599 0. 374106 2.094433 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 18 0.058002 0.079781 -0.2055 0.164965 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 18 0.061576 0.077466 -0.20436 0.162984 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 18 0.045577 0.065915 -0.18857 0.114511 
1 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 10 1.050585 0.648486 0.364545 2.27 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 10 0.048796 0.08013 -0.10087 0.210707 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 10 0.056573 0.079157 -0.0953 0.211485 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 10 0.040001 0.063267 -0.09704 0.146203 
2 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 6 0.785195 0.260821 0.429646 1.147828 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 6 0.01019 0.059267 -0. 10087 0.064335 
Grs—Prft/Tot_Asst 5 0.033399 0.025743 0.005115 0.063294 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 6 0.003971 0.052388 -0.09704 0.046547 
3 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 5 0.891107 0.342553 0.534925 1.328833 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 5 0.020094 0.032809 -0.00146 0.077966 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 5 0.021698 0.032048 0.002737 0.078626 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 5 0.014602 0. 020777 0. 002072 0. 051346 
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Table 3 Summary statistics for the domestic M&A performance 
W e define the actual M & A transaction year as time 0, the year after the transaction as time 1，and the last 
year before the transaction as time -1. Opr_Inc/Tot_asst is the short form of Operating Income/Total Assets. 
EBIT/Tot—Asst is the short form of EBIT/Total Assets. Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of Gross Profit/ 
Total Assets. Net_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of Net Profit/Total Assets. A n d S.D. means standard 
deviation. 
Time Variable No. of Qbs Mean S. D. ^ Max 
-3 Opr—Inc/Tot_Asst 51 0.567918 0.316514 0.090419 1.236899 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 51 0.05064 0.058357 -0. 12198 0.200817 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 51 0.057453 0.058058 -0.15485 0.200791 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 51 0.045383 0.051175 -0.15485 0.165604 
-2 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 57 0.573051 0.336013 -0.02833 1.642764 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 57 0.052499 0.05395 -0.09522 0.218648 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 57 0.055319 0.053683 -0.10868 0.218866 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 57 0.03946 0.043241 -0.10868 0.166942 
-1 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 60 0.584747 0.376448 0.131374 1.826806 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 60 0.04405 0.076237 -0.16254 0.169553 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 60 0.044974 0.084013 -0.2155 0.167978 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 60 0.028671 0.073904 -0.21407 0.145253 
0 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 59 0.661796 0.442876 0,03053 2.02439 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 59 0.064491 0.073061 -0.11885 0.340061 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 59 0.069792 0.070694 -0.12794 0.338298 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 59 0.051399 0.059598 -0.12433 0.284438 
1 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 25 0.60349 0.502189 0.000569 2.02439 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 25 0.049291 0.067584 -0.12315 0.15727 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 25 0.049976 0.083486 -0.22014 0.155329 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 25 0.035017 0.070756 -0.20697 0. 109034 
2 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 17 0.407617 0.245099 0 0.911593 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 17 -0.12696 0.65493 -2.65505 0. 149682 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 17 -0.1471 0.763486 -3.09824 0.146176 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 17 -0.16211 0.758678 -3.09824 0.103309 
3 Opr_Inc/Tot—Asst 15 0.365376 0.284446 0.006089 1.076103 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 15 0.003254 0.087189 -0.17632 0.134419 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 15 0.026847 0.079354 -0.19298 0.134101 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 15 0. 012779 0. 0667 -Q. 18964 0. 1 
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Table 3 Summary statistics for the domestic M&A performance 
W e define the actual M & A transaction year as time 0, the year after the transaction as time 1, and the last 
year before the transaction as time -1. Opr_Inc/Tot_asst is the short form of Operating Income/Total Assets. 
EBITATot.Asst is the short form of EBITTTotal Assets. Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of Gross Profit/ 
Total Assets. Net_Prft/Tot_Asst is the short form of Net Profit/Total Assets. And S.D. means standard 
deviation. 
Time Variable Mean S. D. Min Max 
-3 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 43 0.488939 0.259891 0.03489 1.373626 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 43 0.02904 0.057554 -0.10813 0.175226 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 43 0.032654 0.061524 -0.11351 0.174159 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 43 0.023364 0.051753 -0.11351 0.115446 
-2 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 45 0.50159 0.278904 0.030172 1.407326 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 45 0.020317 0.053276 -0.14354 0.171611 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 45 0.023398 0.060432 -0.1569 0.169651 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 45 0.015097 0.051686 -0.1557 0.101449 
-1 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 46 0.570332 0.374664 0.002816 1.642764 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 46 0.019266 0.048406 -0.11006 0.170296 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 46 0.024527 0.05376 -0.17329 0.169416 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 46 0.016794 0.044192 -0.17329 0.10048 
0 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 46 0.666277 0.480735 0.027266 2.275212 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 46 0.024295 0.054033 -0.1726 0.1271 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 46 0.028941 0.057676 -0.19919 0.178682 
Net_Prft/Tot_Asst 46 0.021564 0.050381 -0.19671 0.178682 
1 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 19 0.70811 0.472056 0.110792 2.02439 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 19 0.028926 0.099652 -0.2881 0. 199517 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 19 0.027511 0.112716 -0.34911 0.206712 
Net—Prft/Tot_Asst 19 0.017761 0.107618 -0.34899 0.192996 
2 Opr—Inc/Tot—Asst 10 0.525932 0.280339 0.21036 1.1357 
EBIT/Tot—Asst 10 0.034367 0.074593 -0.1472 0.145008 
Grs—Prft/Tot—Asst 10 0.03497 0.072351 -0.14916 0.128921 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 10 0.023466 0.064298 -0.14552 0.095944 
3 Opr_Inc/Tot_Asst 9 0.624818 0.438496 0.195863 1.395867 
EBIT/Tot_Asst 9 0.018335 0. 120231 -0.2552 0.174519 
Grs_Prft/Tot_Asst 9 0.051552 0.064128 -0.07621 0.167094 
Net—Prft/Tot—Asst 9 0. 039945 0. 054774 -Q. 07359 0. 132997 
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Table 5 Comparison for Operating Income/Total Assets among Foreign M&A 
group, Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-l,t) means comparing the Operating Income/ Total Assets in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. 
The numbers in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column 'Wilcoxon-test' are 
z-statistics. * Significance at the 1 0 % level. ” Idem., the 5 % ***Idem.，the 1 % 
Operating 
Income/Total Foreign M & A Domestic M & A N o n M & A 
sse s Unpaired wilcoxon-test Wilcoxon-test Uijpajd wilcoxon-test 
t-test t-test i-icm 
(-3-2) 0.2623 0.592 -0.0814 -0.965 -0.2199 -0.495 
(-2-1) -0.5134 -2.025** -0.1770 -1.347 -0.9911 -1.58么 * 
(.1 0) -1 1321 -1.807* -1.0232 -2.914*** -1.0677 -3.633 
(-1’1) -1 7226* -0.561 -0.1889 -1.520 -1.2478 -1.610 
( . 1 2 ) - 0 2 4 5 7 0 . 9 4 3 1 . 8 2 8 6 * - 0 . 9 2 3 0 . 3 5 2 8 - 0 . 7 6 4 
(-1，3) -0 9744 0.944 2.1072** -0.227 -0.3883 -0.770 
(O'l) -0 8221 -0.968 0.5300 -0.471 -0.3207 -1.087 
(1 2) 0.9468 -1.153 1.4880 -0.664 1.1155 0.255* 
(2,3) -0.5832 -2.023" 0.4513 0.114 -0.5922 ± 8 3 6 
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Table 7 Comparison for Gross Profit/Total Assets among Foreign M&A group, 
Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-l,t) means comparing the EBIT/ Total Assets in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. The numbers 
in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column 'Wilcoxon-test' are z-statistics. * 
Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % "*Idem., the 1 % 
EB^^s^tal Foreign M & A Domestic M & A N o n M & A 
sse Unpaired wilcoxon-test Wilcoxon-test Wilcoxon-test 
t-test t-test t-test 
(-3,-2) 0.6521 2.059** -0.1720 -0.141 0.7382 1.908* 
(-2,-1) -0.5292 -1.328 0.6887 1.212 0.0985 0.277 
(-1,0) -0.2387 -0.631 -1.4929 -2.378** -0.4702 -0.552 
(-1,1) 0.1617 0.051 -0.2981 -1.117 -0.5274 -1.087 
(-1 2) 1.7472* 1.363 2.0080** 0.497 -0.8064 -0.764 
(-13) 1.3880 1.483 1.8013* 0.625 0.0396 -0.533 
( 0 , 1 ) 0 . 2 9 2 2 1 . 3 7 6 0.8908 1 . 2 7 8 -0.2420 - 0 . 5 6 3 
(1.2) 1.0190 -0.105 1.3428 1.138 -0.1513 1.070 
(2.3) -0.3318 -0.674 -0.7626 -0.625 0.3534 -0.059 
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Table 7 Comparison for Gross Profit/Total Assets among Foreign M&A group, 
Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-l,t) means comparing the Gross Profit/ Total Assets in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. The 
numbers in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column 'Wilcoxon-test' are z-statistics. 
Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5% *** Idem., the 1 % 
Gross 
Profit/Total Foreign M & A Domestic M & A N o n M & A 
Assets 
Unpaired wilcoxon-test Unpaired wilcoxon-test Ui^^fired wilcoxon-test 
t-test t-test t-test 
(-3,-2) 0.5049 2.20广 0.1985 1.040 0.7119 2.813*** 
(-2,-1) -0.9160 -1.285 0.7891 0.775 -0.0942 -0.107 
(-1,0) 0.1272 -0.370 -1.7422* -1.804* -0.3797 0.180 
(-1:1) 0.3592 0.153 -0.2506 -0.686 -0.1450 -0.523 
(-1’,2) 2.0017* 1.214 1.9396* 0.497 -0.5225 0.561 
(-1,3) 2.6663" 1.753* 0.7552 -0.057 -1.3372 0.059 
(0,1) 0.1625 1.070 1.1122 1.574 0.0677 -0.282 
(1’，2) 0.6278 - 0 . 1 3 5 1 . 2 8 6 8 1 . 4 2 2 -0.1889 0 . 8 6 6 
(23) 0.6365 -0.365 -0.8765 -0.795 -0.5261 -1-125 
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Table 7 Comparison for Gross Profit/Total Assets among Foreign M&A group, 
Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-l，t) means comparing the Net Profit/ Total Assets in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. The 
numbers in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column ‘Wilcoxon-test，are z-statistics. * 
Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % *"Idem.，the 1 % 
Net 
Profit/Total Foreign M & A Domestic M & A N o n M & A 
Assets 
U 叩 aired Wilcoxon-test Unpaired wilc。x。n-test Wilcoxon-test 
t-test t-test t-test 
(-3,-2) 0.5914 2.438" 0.6518 2.615*** 0.7495 2.451" 
(-2,-1) -0.8815 -0.849 0.9573 1.092 -0.1684 0.841 
(-1,0) 0.2048 -0.414 -1.8448* -1.691* -0.4827 0.158 
(-1,1) 0.5427 0.051 -0.3651 -0.605 -0.0517 -0.241 
( - 1 , 2 ) 2 . 9 3 8 0 " * 1 . 7 8 2 * 1.9478* 0 . 7 3 4 -0.3973 0 . 5 6 1 
(-1,3) 2.9408*" 1.753* 0.7585 0.057 -1.3825 0.059 
(0,1) 0.2175 1.172 1.0885 1.493 0.1948 0.322 
(1.2) 1.1705 0.524 1.2984 2.18 广 -0.1531 1.172 
(2.3) -0.4237 -0.944 -0.8881 -0.682 -0.5977 -0.652 
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Table 7 Comparison for Gross Profit/Total Assets among Foreign M&A group, 
Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-1 ,t) means comparing the operating performance measures in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. The 
numbers in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column 'Wilcoxon-test' are z-statistics. * 
Significance at the 1 0 % level. ** Idem., the 5 % ***Idem., the 1 % 
Foreign V.S. Domestic Foreign V.S. Non 
Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test 
Operating Income/Total Assets 
(-3, -2) -1.3922 0.356 -1.5958 -0.471 
(-2,-1) 0.5248 0.672 -0.2083 -0.639 
(-1,0) 1.1395 0.022 0.4959 0.675 
(0,1) 0.8502 0.561 0.2496 1.274 
(1,2) 0.3447 0.734 1.1610 0.943 
2. 3329** 1.214 0. 1349 1.214 
EBIT/Total Assets 
(-3, -2) -1.3367 -1.423 -0.3202 1.664* 
(-2,-1) 1.6227 1.913* 0.8511 1.586 
(-1,0) -0.9908 -1.285 0.0812 -1. 198 
(0, 1) -0.2802 0.051 -0.4090 -0.968 
(1,2) 0.6686 1.572 0.2564 0.943 
(2，3) -0. 4765 0. 135 1. 1616 0. 674 
Gross Profit/Total Assets 
(-3, -2) -0.8227 -1.067 -0.0974 1.601 
(-2,-1) 1.7901* 1.655* 0.8063 2.343** 
(-1,0) -1.3919 -1.241 -0. 3242 -0.936 
(0，1) 0.3061 0.255 0.0319 -0.459 
(1,2) 0.6517 1.214 0.7710 1.483 
-0. 5050 -0. 730 -0. 5652 0. 365 
Net Profit/Total Assets 
(-3，-2) -0.589 -1.511 -0. 1975 0.596 
(-2,-1) 1.7463* 2.017** 0.6928 2.012** 
(-1,0) -1.4576 -1.241 -0.4078 -0.936 
(0，1) 0. 1237 0.255 0. 1346 -0.357 
(1,2) 0.6595 1. 782* 0.0442 0.524 
(2，3) -0. 5085 -0. 944 -Q. 0627 0. 944 
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Table 10 Post-Acquisition Comparison for Operating Performance among Foreign 
M&A group, Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
(t-l,t) means comparing the operating performance measures in year t-1 with the one in the coming year, year t. The 
numbers in column 'Unpaired t-test，are t-statistics, and the numbers in column 'Wilcoxon-test' are z-statistics. * 
Significance at the 1 0 % level. ” Idem., the 5 % 術 Idem., the 1 % 
Foreign V.S. Domestic Foreign V.S. Non 
Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test 
Operating Income/Total Assets 
(-1,0) 1.1395 0.022 0.4959 0.675 
(-1, 1) 1.0109 0.561 0.5777 0.663 
(-1,2) -1.6277 -1.153 -1.4474 -0.524 
(-1’ 3) -0. 8485 -1.214 -1. 3266 -0. 405 
EBIT/Total Assets 
(-1,0) -0.9908 -1.285 0.0812 -1.198 
(-1, 1) -0.8761 -0.663 -0.4769 -0.866 
(-1,2) 0.4240 -0.314 -1.2797 -1.363 
(-1，3) -0. 8426 -1. 214 -0. 7139 -0. 944 
Gross Profit/Total Assets 
(-1,0) -1.3919 -1.241 -0.3242 -0.936 
(-1, 1) -0.4663 -0.764 -0. 1977 -0.561 
(-1,2) 0.4552 0. 135 -0.5553 -0.944 
(-1,3) -1. 1721 -1.214 -1. 3997 -0. 405 
Net Profit/Total Assets 
(-1,0) -1.4576 -1.241 -0.4078 -0.936 
(-1，1) -0.6377 -0.866 -0. 1636 -0.255 
(-1,2) 0.4341 -0. 314 -0.9635 -2.201** 
(-1,3) -1. 1673 -0. 944 -1.4026 -0. 674 
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Table 7 Comparison for Gross Profit/Total Assets among Foreign M&A group, 
Domestic M&A group and Non-M&A group 
According to C S M A R Database, there are 6 types of restructuring activities: A - acquisition of other 
firms, B — purchase of assets, C - divestitures, D - equity transfers, E - exchange of assets, and F - debt 
restructuring. W e followed the classification used by S C M A R Database, and w e define Xt as the 
frequencies of type X restructuring activities which occurred in year t (X={A, B, C, D , E, F}, and 
r=0,1,2,3). * Significance at the 10% level. ** Idem., the 5 % ***Idem., the 1 % 
Restructuring Foreign V.S. Domestic Foreign V.S. Non 
Activities Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test Unpaired t-test Wilcoxon-test 
A O 1.3590 0.447 1.1320 0.816 
B O -0.8989 1.000 -0.8787 -0.577 
C O -0.1667 -1.000 -0.1608 N/A 
D O 0.5327 0.816 0.6216 1.342 
EO 0.6141 0.577 0.5817 0.577 
A l -0.1667 -0.577 -0.1608 -0.577 
B1 0.9215 0.577 0.0000 -0.447 
CI -0.3833 -1.342 -0.8787 -1.414 
D 1 -1.8729* -1.732* -2.2315** -1.732* 
El -1.1193 -1.414 -1.7918* -2.000" 
A 2 -0.9608 -1.732* -1.1157 -1.414 
B 2 0.4249 0.000 -0.1608 -1.000 
C 2 0.0925 -1.000 0.6733 0.000 
D 2 0.3573 0.000 -0.2356 -0.447 
E2 -0.7777 -1.000 N/A N/A 
A 3 -1.2627 -2.236" -0.9004 -1.414 
B3 -1.1193 -1.732* -0.9004 -1.414 
C3 0.3573 -1.134 0.5817 -0.577 
D 3 -1.1193 -2.000" -0.6294 -1.000 
E3 -0.5452 -1.000 ^ N ^ 
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Figure 1 Comparison for operating income/total assets between treatment group 
and control groups 
Using the mean of operating income/total assets in Table 2 to Table 4, we plot the pre-
and post-acquisition operating performance dynamics to compare treatment group and 
control groups in the following 7-year window 
Operating Income/ Total Assets 
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Figure 2 Comparison for EBIT/total assets between treatment group and control 
groups 
Using the mean of EBIT/total assets in Table 2 to Table 4，we plot the pre- and 
post-acquisition operating performance dynamics to compare treatment group and 
control groups in the following 7-year window 
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Figure 3 Comparison for gross profit/total assets between treatment group and 
control groups 
Using the mean of gross profit/total assets in Table 2 to Table 4, we plot the pre- and 
post-acquisition operating performance dynamics to compare treatment group and 
control groups in the following 7-year window 
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Figure 4 Comparison for net profit/total assets between treatment group and 
control groups 
Using the mean of net profit/total assets in Table 2 to Table 4, we plot the pre- and 
post-acquisition operating performance dynamics to compare treatment group and 
control groups in the following 7-year window 
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